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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THREE ESSAYS ON MUNICIPAL STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT FISCAL
MANAGEMENT OUTCOMES
This dissertation aims to reclassify municipal structures of the U.S. municipalities
and investigates the effect of municipal structures on government fiscal management
outcomes, including fiscal conditions and fiscal slack balances. This dissertation is
comprised of four chapters. The first chapter briefly introduces, and each of the remaining
three is an independent research article. The second chapter investigates seven essential
structural characteristics of the U.S. municipalities and constructs a municipal structure
political-administrative index. It then examines the determinants of municipal structures
on a political-administrative dimension. The empirical results show that municipal
structure choices are statistically significantly associated with citizens’ socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics. Citizens’ income levels play a crucial role in determining
municipal structure changes during the sample period.
The third chapter examines the effect of municipal structures on government fiscal
conditions. Municipal structure is operationalized by the municipal structure politicaladministrative index, which is the focus of the second chapter. There are a variety of
mechanisms through which municipal structures can influence government fiscal
conditions, among which managerial professionalism, strategy stance, and managerial
accountability versus efficiency are theoretically addressed. Empirical evidence shows that
a municipal structure that is more administrative is associated with healthier fiscal
conditions in cash solvency, dependence on intergovernmental transfers, and debt level.
Particularly, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the municipal structure
index and governments’ fiscal conditions. Moreover, municipal structures moderate the
influence of external environmental factors.
The fourth chapter investigates the determinants of local government’s fiscal slack
in a political-budgetary-managerial framework. The research argues that voters’
preferences, government’s budgetary performance, and government internal management
work interactively to influence government fiscal slack, and it proposes appropriate
indicators for the three explanatory dimensions. Particularly, government internal
management is operationalized by the municipal structure political-administrative index.
Empirical results show that voters’ anti-tax and pro-spending sentiment have a negative
effect on the size of government fiscal slack, and government’s budgetary performance
exerts a positive impact. Moreover, government internal management modifies the effects
of voters’ preferences and government’ budgetary performance on government fiscal slack.

KEYWORDS: Municipal Structures, Political-Administrative Index, Government Fiscal
Management, Fiscal Conditions, Fiscal Slack
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Municipal structures as one of the fundamental institutional settings in the U.S.
municipalities play an important role in organizing city politics and influencing policy
formulation and implementation (Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2004b; Svara and
Watson 2010). There are five statutory forms of municipal structures in the U.S.
municipalities: mayor-council, council-manager, commission, town meeting, and
representative town meeting. Mayor-council and council-manager are the most widely
adopted statutory municipal structures, and the other three are adopted by a minority group
of municipalities, mainly in the New England states. Most previous studies, and also this
dissertation, primarily focuses on the mayor-council and council-manager municipal
structures.
Based on the traditional wisdom, the main characteristics of the mayor-council
structure include: The mayor is elected separately from the council and elected directly by
the voters, the mayor is responsible for administrative affairs, and the council is responsible
for legislation (Frederickson and Johnson 2001). The main characteristics of the councilmanager structure include: The council is responsible for both administrative affairs and
legislation, the council usually appoints a professional manager as the chief administrative
officer to manage administrative affairs, and the mayor is a ceremonial position and is
usually selected by council members on a rotating basis (Frederickson and Johnson 2001).
Municipalities’ structures are dynamic and adapt over time (Svara and Watson
2010). Before the early twentieth century, the strong mayor or classic mayor-council was
the dominant municipal structure, which was suited to machine politics and resulted in
widespread corruption of governments (Judd and Swanstrom 2015). The reformed
1

manager or classic council-manager structure was invented in the Progressive Era. Its
proponents aimed to reduce corruption, withstand machine politics, and provide public
services efficiently (Judd and Swanstrom 2015; Wheeland, Palus, and Wood 2014). Since
the 1950s, cross-adoption of structural characteristics between the mayor-council and
council-manager structures is so common that the boundary between them has become
ambiguous. The dichotomous separation of the primary municipal structures into the
mayor-council or council-manager has limitations because it ignores important subsidiary
features.
Previous studies have used various methods to reclassify municipal structures,
among which the “Type III City” framework (the political, the administrative, and the
adapted) of Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004a, 2004b) is the most influential. The
second chapter of this dissertation creates an innovative municipal structure politicaladministrative index to reclassify municipal structures by examining seven essential
structural characteristics that can distinguish municipal structures. Compared to the
previous efforts, the index has the merit of comprehensively evaluating the political or
administrative nature of municipal structures by investigating more structural
characteristics. After introducing the index and discussing its validity and reliability, the
second chapter investigates the determinants of municipal structures on the politicaladministrative dimension. It summarizes the political conflict theory and class cleavage
theory from the related literature and incorporates these theories into the theoretical model
of cost analysis. Empirical results demonstrate that the municipal structure politicaladministrative index is tightly associated with citizens’ socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics, most of which are consistent with the theoretical predictions and previous

2

studies. Regarding the changes in municipal structures during the sample period, the
research finds that municipalities that have higher per capita incomes are more likely to
adapt toward the administrative structure.
The third chapter aims to relate municipal structures, which is operationalized by
the municipal structure political-administrative index, to government fiscal conditions.
Municipal structures are correlated with government internal management through a
variety of mechanisms. The administrative municipal structure promotes managerial
professionalism and efficiency and stimulates officials to act as prospectors in the choice
of managerial strategy stance. These effects lead to a positive correlation between the
municipal structure political-administrative index and government fiscal performance. On
the other hand, considering the public nature of governments, officials’ accountability to
the public and prompt reacting to the dynamic demands of voters are also important for
improving government performance. This study accordingly hypothesizes that the
municipal structure that mixes the political and administrative characteristics may result in
better fiscal conditions, which implies an inverted U-shaped relationship between the
municipal structure index and indicators of government fiscal conditions. In addition,
municipal structure can moderate effects of the factors of external environment on
government fiscal performance. The empirical evidence supports the proposed hypotheses
for the fiscal conditions of governments in cash solvency, dependence on
intergovernmental transfers, and debt level. The evidence becomes stronger when using
instrumental variables to solve the endogeneity problem of municipal structures.
The last chapter examines the effect of municipal structures on government fiscal
slack in a three-dimensional framework composed of voters’ preferences, government’s

3

budgetary performance, and government internal management. Particularly, government
internal management is operationalized by the municipal structure political-administrative
index. Saving fiscal slack in economic booms to prepare for fiscal crises in the future is a
prevailing strategy adopted by the U.S. state and local governments. Fiscal slack of local
government is a more salient issue compared to the state due to the large size and informal
forms. The study uses Massachusetts municipalities as a research sample. The empirical
findings show that the defined budgetary gap is positively and statistically significantly
related to government’s fiscal slack balances, which is measured by either the level of
stabilization funds or the sum of stabilization funds and other informal forms of fiscal slack
resources. However, the municipal structure political-administrative index weakens the
positive effect of the budgetary gap. The pro-spending sentiment of voters has a negative
effect on government fiscal slack, and the municipal structure index weakens the negative
effect.
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CHAPTER 2. THE DETERMINANTS OF MUNICIPAL STRUCTURES ON A POLITICALADMINISTRATIVE DIMENSION
2.1

Introduction
Municipal structures play an important role in organizing city politics and

influencing policy formulation and implementation (Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood,
2004b; Svara & Watson, 2010). Formal municipal structures provide the framework within
which the policy maker “sets the rules of participation, exercises authority by making and
carrying out the law (statutes, ordinances, or regulations), selects persons to politically
represent all residents or some subset of residents, operates a permanent bureaucracy,
provides services, and determines who will pay what in taxes.” (Frederickson, Johnson, &
Wood, 2004b). Also, municipal structures can “supply particular channels for information
to travel through and among organizations.” (Clingermayer & Feiock, 2001).
Like most scholars in this field, in this study, we focus on U.S. municipalities with
the statutory form of mayor-council or council-manager.1 Municipalities’ structures are
dynamic and adapt over time (Svara & Watson, 2010). Before the early twentieth century,
the strong mayor or classic mayor-council was the dominant municipal structure, which
was suited to machine politics and resulted in widespread corruption of governments (Judd
& Swanstrom, 2015). The reformed manager or classic council-manager structure was
invented in the Progressive Era. Its proponents aimed to reduce corruption, withstand
machine politics, and provide public services efficiently (Judd & Swanstrom, 2015;

1

The other three statutory municipal forms include the commission, the town meeting, and the representative
town meeting. These forms are adopted by a minority group of municipalities, mainly in the New England
states. According to the data from the Municipal Form of Government surveys by the International
City/County Management Association, 9.7%, 9.7%, 8.0%, 6.7%, 7.6%, 6.7%, and 8.0% of the responding
municipalities adopt these three forms in 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2011.

5

Wheeland, Palus, & Wood, 2014). The classic council-manager structure, first adopted in
1908 in Staunton, Virginia, was the most influential reformed municipal structure in the
first half of the twentieth century (Choi, Feiock, & Bae, 2013; Svara & Watson, 2010;
Wheeland, Palus, & Wood, 2014).
Conventional wisdom holds that, since the 1950s, the balance between various types
of municipal structures has been stabilized (Choi, Feiock, & Bae, 2013). There have been,
however, two emerging trends in municipal structure changes in recent decades. First,
cross-adoption of structural characteristics between the mayor-council and councilmanager structures is so common that the boundary between them has become ambiguous.
The dichotomous separation of municipal structures into the mayor-council or councilmanager has limitations because it ignores important subsidiary features. Scholars have
proposed the so-called “Type III City” framework to reclassify municipal structures
(Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004a, 2004b; Frederickson & Johnson, 2001;
Frederickson, Wood, & Logan, 2001). Second, based on data from the Municipal Form of
Government surveys by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA),
between 1981 and 2011, the proportion of mayor-council municipalities was still declining
and the proportion of council-manager municipalities was increasing. Figure 1.1 displays
the trends.2

2

Figure 1.1 displays the percentages of only the mayor-council and council-manager municipalities, ignoring
municipalities with the other three statutory forms. Therefore, the sum of percentages in each year is less
than 100%.
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Figure 1.1 Percentages of Mayor-Council and Council-Manager Municipalities by Year

We aim to examine what factors determine municipal structure choices in this
study. Some previous studies have involved this topic, but most previous studies use crosssectional data and a small sample of municipalities, usually the municipalities that have a
large population size (Choi, Feiock, & Bae, 2013; Gordon, 1968; Kessel, 1962; Knoke,
1982; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967). We continue this thread of research and aim to
contribute to the scholarship both theoretically and empirically with panel data for a large
number of municipalities.
This research is organized as follows: Section two briefly introduces the related
literature; section three measures municipal structures on a political-administrative
dimension and discusses the reliability and validity of the municipal structure index;
section four builds a theoretical model to explain municipal structure choices; section five
proposes some hypotheses; section six introduces the methodology, and section seven
presents the empirical findings. This research ends with brief conclusions in the last
section.

7

2.2

Related Literature
This section examines both the theoretical argument and empirical evidence on

municipal structures. Scholars have developed theories from political and social science
to explain municipal structure adoptions and changes. Political conflict theory and class
cleavage theory dominate these theories. The research considered here is based on the idea
that citizens can form and express preferences about municipal structure choices and that
municipal structure reflects those preferences.
Kessel (1962) develops the political conflict theory and discusses municipal
government structure choices from the perspective of a conflicting political environment.
Kessel (1962) holds that the political mayor-council structure is adopted in municipalities
where defined social norms and benefits must be adhered to, where conflicting benefits
exist and have to be arbitrated, and where disadvantaged groups need political channels
for expression.
The social cleavage theory, which is utilized by many scholars in this field, holds
that groups from various backgrounds in terms of religion, wealth, profession, race,
ethnicity, and educational attainment, have different preferences in methods of political
participation and in pursuit of interests. Hirschman (1982) argues that municipal structures
are highly dynamic and change based on the shifting values between pursuits of the private
interests of individuals and the public interests of the society as an entity. Such scholars as
Banfield and Wilson (1963), Lineberry and Fowler (1967), Hays (1974), Knoke (1982),
Simmons and Simmons (2004), and Choi, Feiock, and Bae (2013) believe that the shift of
municipal structures from the unreformed strong mayor to the reformed council-manager
is the result of contests between two groups: (1) the moralistic middle- and upper-class

8

predominantly white native Protestants and business and professional elite, who have
higher educational degrees, hold “public regarding ethos,” and seek a structure responsive
to their interests and (2) the working class, minorities, the poor, and immigrants, who want
a government responsive to their needs.
Different from the political conflict theory and class cleavage theory, Knoke (1982)
describes the adoption of the reformed council-manager municipal structure as an
innovation diffusion process. Simmons and Simmons (2004) explain municipal structure
choices from five perspectives, including government design flaws, political conflicts,
sociodemographic cleavage, government legitimacy problems, and leadership deficits. 3
The evidence from empirical exploration is mixed. Kessel (1962) finds that the
reformed council-manager structure is associated with a medium-size population, a high
growth rate, a small percentage of foreign-born population, and an economic base with a
large fraction in professional service and a small fraction in manufacturing. Wolfinger and
Field (1966) and Farnham and Bryant (1985) discover that the region and age of cities are
essential in determining governmental structures. Findings of Lineberry and Fowler (1967)
demonstrate that reformed cities are more homogenous in terms of race, ethnicity, and
religion, which is consistent with the social cleavage theory. Gordon (1968) demonstrates
that the fraction of immigrants is associated with a higher probability of adopting
unreformed political municipal structures. Dye and MacManus (1976) use discriminant
function analysis to explore the determinants of municipal government structures, and they
find that the ethnicity composition predicts the type of constituency (ward or at-large) well,

3

Many of their perspectives are close to the political conflict theory and class cleavage theory. Refer to
Simmons and Simmons (2004) for details.
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but the region of municipalities is a better predictor of election method (partisan or
nonpartisan).
Some recent studies also provide evidence. Simmons and Simmons (2004) use
ordinal values to measure municipal structure changes on a political-administrative
dimension. Utilizing the ordered logit model, they find that municipal structures are
affected by the race, ethnicity, and educational attainment of citizens. Choi, Feiock, and
Bae (2013) employ a historical dataset that spans 75 years and contains the 191 largest
cities in 1930 to explore the determinants of adoption and abandonment of the councilmanager structure. Their results show that the economic conditions of municipalities are
the most essential determinants.
Previous studies of municipal structure adoption have several limitations. In
considering the structural choices, almost all previous studies focus on the shift between
the mayor-council and council-manager structures. However, in recent decades,
municipalities on each of these statutory platforms are absorbing characteristics of the
other. A pure city structure, either mayor-council or council-manager, is inadequate to
reflect the complex features of municipal structures in reality. So far, there is a lack of
evidence on determinants of municipal structures among multiple possible choices.
Second, most previous studies focus on a limited number of municipalities, usually the
ones with a large population. Therefore, lessons have limited external generalizability.
Last, much prior research uses the method of comparison of sample means of
municipalities’ characteristics in different structures, and most previous studies use oneyear cross-sectional data. Although some recent studies utilize a panel dataset that spans a
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longer time period and adopt more advanced econometric models (Choi, Feiock, & Bae,
2013; Simmons & Simmons, 2004), evidence is insufficient.

2.3

Measuring Municipal Structures on a Political-Administrative Dimension
2.3.1 Merits of the Municipal Structure Political-Administrative Index
The motivation of reclassifying and measuring municipal structures on a political-

administrative dimension is rooted in the limitation of the binary separation of the main
municipal structures into the mayor-council and council-manager forms. As argued in
many previous studies, the prevalent cross-adoption of characteristics between these two
structures makes a dichotomous classification problematic (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2008,
2009, 2010; Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004a, 2004b; Nelson & Svara, 2010). We
provide statistical evidence to support this argument, using the data from the Municipal
Form of Government survey in 2011 by the ICMA.
Based on the traditional wisdom, the main characteristics of the mayor-council
structure include: The mayor is elected separately from the council and elected directly by
the voters, the mayor is responsible for administrative affairs, and the council is
responsible for legislation (Frederickson & Johnson, 2001). The main characteristics of
the council-manager structure include: The council is responsible for both administrative
affairs and legislation, the council usually appoints a professional manager as the chief
administrative officer to manage administrative affairs, and the mayor is a ceremonial
position and is usually selected by council members on a rotating basis (Frederickson &
Johnson, 2001).

11

Among the 3,566 municipalities responding to ICMA’s survey in 2011, 1,182
(33%) used the mayor-council structure, and 2,098 (59%) used the council-manager
structure. Other structures account for 8%. Among the mayor-council municipalities,
1,093 had a mayor elected directly by voters, but 50 had a mayor that was selected by
council members from themselves or council members rotated into the position. In 620 of
the 1,182 mayor-council municipalities, the mayor was independent from the council;
however, the mayor served in the council in 514 municipalities. Moreover, in 717 of the
1,182 mayor-council municipalities, there was a chief administrative officer who was
responsible for or helped the mayor manage administrative affairs. The statistical analysis
shows that the mayor-council municipalities used many of the structural characteristics of
the council-manager structure. Similar cross-adoption of structural characteristics existed
in the council-manager municipalities. For instance, among the 2,098 municipalities that
reported a council-manager structure, 1,039 had a mayor who was directly elected by
voters. This is a sharp contrast to the traditional wisdom. Data from ICMA’s surveys for
other years (2001, 2006) show similar findings.
Both existing evidence from previous studies and our statistical analysis of survey
data reveal that separating the main municipal structures into the mayor-council and
council-manager forms is problematic. In this study, we investigate seven essential
structural characteristics (presented in table 1.1) of municipalities. These structural
characteristics are well discussed by Carr and Karuppusamy (2008, 2009), Frederickson,
Johnson, & Wood (2004a, 2004b), and Frederickson and Johnson (2001), who attempt to
use the characteristics to reclassify municipal structures. We assign each characteristic a
numerical value of 0, 0.5, or 1 based on its political or administrative nature. We conduct
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factor analysis of the seven values of structural characteristics to construct a municipal
structure political-administrative index. A lower index indicates a more political municipal
structure, underscoring checks and balances between the mayor and council members,
representation of interests of particular groups and specific districts, direct responsiveness
and accountability of the mayor to voters, and influence of parties in local politics. On the
contrary, the more administrative municipal structure, indicated by a higher index, stresses
professional management of municipality affairs, membership of the mayor in the council,
concentration of authority in council, and elimination of partisan influence on elections.
Table 1.1 Standards of Constructing Municipal Structure Political-Administrative Index
Standards\Coded values
Statutory form
Existence of Chief Administrative Officer
Mayor election method
Mayor is independent of council
Authority of mayor to veto council
Partisan or nonpartisan election of council members
At-large or by-district election of council members

0
Mayor-council
No
Direct election
Yes
Yes
Partisan
By-district

0.5

1
Council-manager
Yes
Non-direct election
No
No
Nonpartisan
Combination At-large

Previous studies have proposed various approaches to reclassify municipal
structures, most of which attempt to reclassify municipal structures into several types.
Among them, the approach of Carr and Karuppusamy (2008, 2009, 2010) is closest to ours
in this study. Modifying the “Type III City” framework (the political, the administrative,
and the adapted) of Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004a, 2004b), Carr and
Karuppusamy (2008, 2009, 2010) classify the mayor-council and council-manager
structures into six subtypes, including the political, adapted political, conciliated political,
conciliated administrative, adapted administrative, and administrative. Carr and
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Karuppusamy (2008, 2009) argue that these subtypes of municipal structures range from
the most political to the most administrative.
A limitation in the approach of Carr and Karuppusamy is that they investigate many
more structural characteristics than that they use to make reclassification, and the
boundaries between their subtypes of municipal structures are sometimes ambiguous. This
limitation is somewhat expected because as more structural characteristics are involved to
reclassify in practice, more subtypes must be defined. Otherwise, many municipalities
cannot be categorized into any specific type. Therefore, our approach of constructing an
index to reclassify municipal structures on a political-administrative dimension has the
merit of comprehensively evaluating the political or administrative nature of municipal
structures by investigating more structural characteristics. We discuss the reliability and
validity of the index below.
2.3.2 Index Reliability
The common method to assess reliability of an index is to evaluate its
“dependability, stability, consistency, reproducibility and lack of distortion.” (Kerlinger &
Lee, 2000). The seven components of our index are objective features for assessing the
political or administrative nature of municipal structures. Municipality samples in ICMA’s
surveys are selected based on their population size. In each survey year, ICMA mails
survey questions to all municipalities with population size above 2,500 and to selected ones
among the small-sized municipalities. To mitigate selection bias, our study includes only
the municipalities with population size above 2,500. The response rates of ICMA’s surveys
in 2001, 2006, and 2011 are all around 50%, which is fairly high for a national survey of
local governments. Our data to construct the index are accessible from ICMA, although
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they are not free. Therefore, the results are reproducible. The form of ICMA’s survey
questions are uniform across time, with few changes. This improves the uniformity and
consistency of the data sources. Moreover, ICMA’s surveys have been conducted every
five years since 1981. Across-time data makes the index more dependable (Clark, 2015).
A useful technique to assess reliability of an index is to evaluate the correlation of
the index components. Table 1.2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for each pair
of the index components in our samples and the statistical significance level. The
components are positively correlated with each other at the 0.01 level, providing evidence
of reliability.
Table 1.2 Correlation Matrix of Index Components

a
b
c
d
e
f
g

a
1
0.5382***
0.3211***
0.4685***
0.4781***
0.2654***
0.2338***

b

c

d

e

f

g

1
0.1871***
0.3272***
0.3312***
0.2212***
0.1697***

1
0.3159***
0.2901***
0.0738***
0.1706***

1
0.5935***
0.2069***
0.2843***

1
0.1950***
0.3228***

1
0.0988***

1

Another technique to evaluate reliability of an index is to calculate the value of
Cronbach’s alpha. Values of Cronbach’s alpha range between 0 and 1, with a higher value
indicating closer correlation between components of the index (Clark, 2015). The value of
Cronbach’s alpha is 0.75 in our case, indicating that reliability of our index is acceptable
(Berman & Wang, 2017).
2.3.3 Index Validity
“With validity, the goal is to figure out if we are measuring the concept that we
intended to measure.” (Clark, 2015). Adopting the method of Clark (2015), we assess
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validity of our index in three aspects: Content validity, criterion-related validity, and
construct validity, using theoretical arguments, existing evidence, and statistical
techniques.
Content validity requires that components of the index should include all possible
items that can measure the core concept (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000), and there should be
evidence from the literature demonstrating the validity of these items in measuring the
concept. The requirement of “all possible items” is extremely strict and can be satisfied
only theoretically. In practice, there may be dozens of potential components (structural
characteristics of municipalities). However, we need to balance thoroughness with
parsimony and to consider data availability. The seven components we include in our
standards in classifying municipal structures are well discussed in the literature by studies
such as Carr and Karuppusamy (2008, 2009), Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood (2004a,
2004b), and Frederickson and Johnson (2001). Therefore, it is safe to use them to construct
our municipal structure index. Particularly, we use more structural characteristics relating
to institutional settings than to management practice.
Criterion-related validity requires the constructed index to be correlated with other
potential measures of the same concept. In our case, the statutory municipal forms, mayorcouncil or council-manager, are traditionally used as a binary measurement of municipal
structures. The former is the political structure and the latter is the administrative structure.
The positive correlations between the statutory municipal form with other six components,
which are presented in the first column in table 1.2, demonstrates that the components of
our index are valid.
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Construct validity is the most important and complex form of measurement validity
(Clark, 2015; Kerlinger & Lee, 2000; Morgan et al., 2001). Assessment of construct
validity is usually conducted by theoretically connecting the components of the index to
the concept that we intend to measure. Also, construct validity asks “which factors account
for the variance in performance of the thing we are trying to measure?” (Clark, 2015). We
first provide a theoretical analysis and then use factor analysis to assess the construct
validity of our index.
As noted previously, the statutory municipal form, mayor-council or councilmanager, is the traditional separation of municipal structures into the political or
administrative ones. Although this separation is problematic because of the cross-adoption
of structural characteristics between themselves, it has intuitive validity to be used as one
component of our municipal structure political-administrative index.
The existence of a chief administrative officer (CAO) is an administrative
municipal structure characteristic. CAOs are usually trained experts who hold professional
degrees and have extensive experience in public management and administration (Demir
& Reddick, 2012; Zhang & Feiock, 2009; Nalbandian, 1999). They usually have
considerable discretion in municipal governments’ policy formulation and implementation
(Zhang, 2014; Zhang & Feiock, 2009; Demir & Reddick, 2012; Selden, Brewer, &
Brudney, 1999). Placing local government management under a CAO has the potential to
increase government management efficiency (Deno & Mehay, 1987; Stumm & Corrigan,
1998).
Political municipal structures are characterized by a mayor who is directly elected
by voters and works independently of the council (Frederickson, Logan, & Wood, 2003;
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Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004a, 2004b; Carr & Karuppusamy, 2008, 2009).
Checks and balances between the mayor and council members constrain their discretion
and mitigate deviations in their behavior from citizens’ preferences (Persson, Roland, &
Tabellini, 1997; Persson & Tabellini, 1999), and citizens will have alternative channels to
express their preferences. Besides, as argued by Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997),
“under appropriate checks and balances, separation of power also helps the voters elicit
information.”4
Political municipal structures are also characterized by the authority of the mayor
to veto council-passed decisions. Public policies can be approved only when both of the
players agree to them (Coate & Knight, 2011). The mayor’s power of vetoing increases
the potential of checks and balances between the mayor and council and provides citizens
more channels to defend their benefits. This characteristic reduces the cost of citizens for
monitoring elected public officials but may increase the political struggles in localities and
lead to inefficient government policy making or implementation (Judd & Swanstrom,
2015; Mossberger, Clarke, & John, 2015).
Partisan and district elections of council members are political municipal structure
characteristics. Partisan elections and council members who are elected by district usually
focus more on the benefits of particular groups or precincts. The political motivation of
catering to a specific group or constituency that can contribute more political support
encourages elected officials to invest a substantial amount of resources in public programs

4

Although the argument of Persson and Tabellini (1997) is implied in the context of comparison between
the presidential or parliamentary systems, it is reasonable to apply the argument in the comparison between
diverse structures in municipalities.
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that might not produce the maximum level of marginal benefits and, hence, creates
government inefficiencies.
We finally use factor analysis to assess whether the seven components of our
municipal structure index are appropriately loaded. The factor analysis reports only one
factor with an eigenvalue greater than one, demonstrating that the components of our index
measure a core concept, which we interpret as the political or administrative nature of
municipal structures. Factor loadings of the principal factor are presented in table 1.3. The
principal factor has positive loadings for all the seven components, among which the
statutory form, existence of CAO, whether mayor is independent of council, and authority
of mayor to veto council, are more highly loaded.
Table 1.3 Factor Analysis of Seven Components of the Index
Index Components
Statutory form
Existence of Chief Administrative Officer
Mayor selection method
Mayor is independent of council
Authority of mayor to veto council
Partisan or nonpartisan election of council members
At-large or by-district election of council members
2.4

Factor 1
0.7173
0.5560
0.4107
0.6923
0.6991
0.3127
0.3783

Uniqueness
0.4483
0.6146
0.8140
0.4918
0.4785
0.8742
0.8337

A Theoretical Model to Explain Municipal Structure Choices
This section incorporates arguments of political conflict theory and class cleavage

theory into our theoretical model of the cost analysis of citizens. The fundamental idea of
political conflict theory and class cleavage theory is that the municipal structure choices
are results of contests between groups with different socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics, who have various interest pursuits and preferences for public policies. We
further argue that the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of citizens in
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municipalities can influence the costs of monitoring government officials and the
inefficiency costs of policy making or implementation. The aim of minimizing the total
costs determines citizens’ municipal structure choices. The main purpose of this section is
to provide an alternative explanation of municipal structure choices.
The theoretical model is based on the fundamental assumption that citizens in local
communities in a representative democracy tend to choose the government structure that
can best delegate governmental management to professionally trained experts for
efficiency gains, while holding public officials accountable. 5 6 7 In this present study, we
define accountability as the extent to which citizens in municipalities can make public
officials, both elected politicians and appointed bureaucrats, be representative of their
particular interests and can have channels to express their preferences in public policy

5

This assumption is based on the premise that local citizens have the autonomy to customize their
government structures in accordance with local characteristics. This is consistent with the argument of
Frederickson at al. (2004a, 2004b) but is criticized by Nelson (2011). The latter argues and empirically finds
that constraints on local government structural choices by states restrict municipalities’ autonomy in
determining their own governmental structures. After an extensive examination of state statutory and
constitutional provisions on structures of local governments with population more than 10,000, Nelson
(2011) finds that 28 states grant the majority of their municipal governments the autonomy to choose their
form at will whereas other states do not. The constraints on municipal structures and modifications are usually
tied to the population size, based on which home rule is designated. To make the argument of this present
research more reliable, the scope of municipalities may be limited to the ones that obtain home rule, or at
least to the ones above a certain population size threshold.
6

“Accountability is an important yet elusive concept whose meaning and characteristics differ depending
upon the context” (Posner, 1995). In political science, accountability usually means the agent must be
answerable to the higher authority who delegates authority to act (Behn, 2001; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987).
Political accountability concerns the degree to which the electorate can control politicians (Lassen, 2000),
usually through regular elections and institutional designs such as initiative and petition.
7

Two components in terms of efficiency exist when this concept is utilized in public management and
economics research: technical efficiency and distributive efficiency. Technical efficiency focuses on the
relationship between inputs and outputs (Mossberger, Clarke, & John, 2015). “The higher the output of some
productive process relative to the input the more technically efficient that process is.” (Mossberger, Clarke,
& John, 2015). Distributive efficiency concerns the relationship between demand and supply and it is
considered to be more distributive efficient when “more people receive the type and level of service they
want.” (Mossberger, Clarke, & John, 2015).
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making. Like many scholars, we define efficiency as the capacity of governments to
enhance public resource utilization.
The proposed assumption is reflected in a wide array of prior studies in political
science. Shepsle (1988) argues that when evaluating a representative government, it is
necessary to consider not only its responsiveness to the constituents but also its efficiency
in dealing with public business. Adsera, Boix, and Payne’s (2003) standards of a wellfunctioning government include efficiency and incorruptness (accountability). Putnam et
al. (1994) point out that a good democratic government is the one that can provide citizens
“the right to petition their government in the hope of achieving some individual or social
goal” (accountability) and actually “gets things done” (efficiency).
The second important assumption is that the elected officials place high priority on
meeting the demands of their constituency; however, professional managers focus on
management efficiency and effectiveness. The main goal of elected public officials is to
get reelected through satisfying demands of voters, and they seek to use political power to
pursue public policy and personal goals (Persson, Roland, & Tabellini, 1997). The expert
managers, who are appointed by elected officials, have to consider not only the demands
of voters that are channeled through orders of the elected officials but also the pressure of
building an outstanding reputation among peers in such professional organizations as
ICMA and the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) (Dunn & Legge, 2001).
The reputation incentive of managers may compel them to deviate from mandates of
elected officials when their professional judgement is at odds with orders from the latter.
Delegating government management to professionally trained managers has the
potential to improve management efficiency but enhances the difficulty of holding the
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managers accountable (Carr, 2015; Deno & Mehay, 1987; Stumm & Corrigan, 1998).
Therefore, the monitoring cost of citizens increases. On the other hand, government
management under directly elected politicians, who focus more on political responsiveness
and gaining reelection, can assure accountability but raise inefficiency cost due to the lack
of managerial expertise. The two simultaneous goals of citizens create a dilemma: They
have to make a trade-off between the interdependent monitoring cost and inefficiency cost.
We construct an index to indicate the political or administrative nature of municipal
structure and array municipal structures on the political-administrative dimension (refer to
discussions in section three). Figure 1.2 illustrates our fundamental theoretical arguments.
The abscissa indicates the political-administrative dimension of municipal structures. The
most political structure is placed at the left end, and the most administrative structure is
placed at the right end. Citizens’ expected monitoring cost increases when municipal
structures move from the political to the administrative; meanwhile, their expected
inefficiency cost declines.
The core of our theoretical model is the trade-off between the expected inefficiency
cost and monitoring cost with movement along the political-administrative dimension. The
optimal structure should be the one that minimizes the total expected costs of inefficiency
and monitoring. As exhibited in figure 1.2, the total expected cost (𝐶𝑠 ) is calculated by
vertically summing the corresponding expected inefficiency cost ( 𝐶1 ) and expected
monitoring cost (𝐶2 ) at a certain structure 𝑆. The optimal structure is denoted as 𝑆 ∗ , with
corresponding total cost at the minimum level 𝐶 ∗ .
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Figure 1.2 Theoretical Model of Optimal Municipal Structure

Notes: The cost curves assume positive first derivative (marginal
cost) and second derivative (increasing cost) in the appropriate direction.
The optimal point is found where the absolute values of the first derivatives
(marginal costs) are equal. That does not imply the levels of the costs are
equal, but that is a possibility that is graphed. The optimal point could be
on either side.
The exact place of 𝑆 ∗ depends on the shapes of the two cost curves. We assume a
concave curve (positive second derivative) for both types of cost, meaning each cost
increases at an increasing rate in the appropriate direction. The sum must have a positive
second derivative, also being concave. As long as costs are low on one end for each, the
optimal structure is a point between the left and right ends. We place the optimal
structure 𝑆 ∗ at the point where the corresponding expected monitoring and inefficiency cost
curves intersect for simplification. In general, the optimum is at the point where both
curves have the same absolute value of the first derivative.
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The optimal structure 𝑆 ∗ changes over time and varies across municipalities. The
actual place of 𝑆 ∗ is presumably determined by citizens’ socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics, which can influence the monitoring and inefficiency cost curves and
derivatives. If either cost exhibits very slow marginal change, then controlling the other
cost dominates the decision. If monitoring is easy, reducing inefficiency with an
administrative structure is an optimal choice. If the opposite, reducing monitoring cost
through increasing the political nature of municipal structures is preferred.

2.5

Hypotheses
Based on previous studies and the theoretical model, we discuss and propose

hypotheses with regard to the effects of some socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics of citizens or municipalities on municipal structure choices in this section.
Those characteristics include income level and inequality, educational attainment, race
composition, economic conditions, and industry structures. Political conflict and class
cleavage theory imply that these characteristics are associated with preferences over
municipal structure choices. In addition, municipality size and the existence of citizens’
initiative are in the model. Municipality size relates to efficiency of government
management and cost of monitoring officials, and initiative allows preferences however
formed to be expressed.
High income groups have advantages in accessing necessary information on public
policy making and government operation because information collection is costly (Downs,
1957). Therefore, monitoring the elected public officials is presumably easier for citizens
with higher income. From another perspective, economic performance and wealth of the
community contribute to accumulation of social capital (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Putnam
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et al., 1994); meanwhile, social capital usually leads to “low social polarization, and formal
institutional rules that constrain the government from acting arbitrarily.” (Knack & Keefer,
1997). Therefore, wealthy municipalities are usually imbedded with formal institutions
that can effectively constrain public officials’ rent seeking behavior. In municipalities with
higher per capita income, citizens may feel it is easier to make public officials accountable
and more necessary to realize government efficiency. Hence, reducing inefficiency with a
more administrative municipal structure is an optimal choice.
Hypothesis 1: The per capita income is positively correlated with the
municipal structure political-administrative index.
Educational attainment contributes to citizens’ active political participation and
increases their exposure to cosmopolitan culture. It helps build civic engagement and
interpersonal trust, which are crucial components of social capital (Brehm & Rahn, 1997;
Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999). “Greater levels of civic engagement and interpersonal
cooperation should lead to closer monitoring and to more abundant information about the
public arena.” (Adsera, Boix, & Payne, 2003). Therefore, gathering information on
government operation and monitoring public officials are relatively easier for groups with
higher educational attainment. In addition, higher educational attainment is generally
correlated with professional and managerial occupations. The fraction of citizens with
educational attainment at high school or above among the citizens who are 25 years old
and over is an indicator of the overall educational attainment of municipalities. In
municipalities with higher educational attainment, citizens may feel it is easier to make
public officials accountable and more important to realize government efficiency. Thus,
reducing inefficiency with a more administrative municipal structure is an optimal choice.
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Hypothesis 2: The educational attainment of citizens is positively
correlated with the municipal structure political-administrative index.
The effect of income inequality can be examined through its relationship with
political engagement in municipalities (Goodin & Dryzek, 1980; Solt, 2004, 2008). Solt
(2008) argues that income inequality may increase citizens’ political engagement because
“higher levels of inequality cause divergences in political preferences that fuel debates
about the appropriate course of policy; these debates then cause higher rates of political
mobilization.” Therefore, in municipalities with a higher level of income inequality,
citizens will more actively participate in political activities and require channels to express
their demands. Hence, the political municipal structures can satisfy the preferences of
citizens. In municipalities with higher levels of income inequality, citizens may feel it is
more important and difficult to make public officials accountable to defend their own
benefits. Also, elected officials are in a better position to mediate interest conflicts in the
community. This research uses the ratio of mean income to median income of citizens as
measurement of the income inequality.
Hypothesis 3: The income inequality is negatively correlated with
the municipal structure political-administrative index.
Previous studies have demonstrated the important role of racial and ethnic
fractionalization in local politics. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) find that racial
fractionalization is associated with patronage spending. “The more fractionalized a society
is, the more difficult it is to govern.” (Keefer, 2007). Besides, racial and ethnic
fractionalization may engender political instability (Horowitz, 1985). Racial and ethnic
fractionalization can provoke fierce conflicts between diverse groups when each group
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actively participates in local politics to advocate its own benefits. All the characteristics
described can sufficiently increase the tendency of citizens in municipalities to choose a
government structure that prompts political accountability for protecting their benefits. We
utilize the proportion of blacks and the proportion of foreign-born citizens among the
whole population as indicators of racial and ethnic fractionalization in municipalities. In
ethnically and racially fractionalized municipalities, citizens may feel it is more important
to make public officials accountable and to have more channels to protect their own
benefits. Therefore, reducing monitoring cost with a more political municipal structure is
an optimal choice.
Hypothesis 4: The proportions of blacks and foreign-born citizens
among the whole population are negatively correlated with the municipal
structure political-administrative index.
The small- and medium-sized communities presumably have lower levels of social
cleavages (Choi, Feiock, & Bae, 2013; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967). To the contrary, a
larger population size has more potential to result in higher levels of diversity and social
cleavages, as well as active political mobilization and engagement. Citizens will have more
incentives to make public officials adhere to their particular benefits.
From another perspective, a large population is generally associated with a larger
bureaucratic system, increasing the cost for citizens to monitor government officials
efficiently. Citizens in municipalities with a large population may feel it is more important
to constrain the behavior of officials because government has charge of more public
resources. In municipalities with a larger population, citizens may feel it is more important
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and difficult to make public officials accountable. Thus, reducing monitoring cost with a
more political municipal structure is an optimal choice.
Hypothesis 5: The population size of municipalities is negatively
correlated with the municipal structure political-administrative index.
Local economic conditions and industry structures can also affect citizens’
municipal structure choices. Choi, Feiock, and Bae (2013) argue that “demand for changes
in forms of local government may occur in response to economic or environmental
concerns of crises that compel local politicians and citizens to question the legitimacy of
existing institutional arrangements.” In municipalities that are mired in economic
hardships, citizens’ passion for governmental structure reform may be provoked. Citizens
in municipalities that face severe economic conditions may feel it is important to have
professional management to improve governmental efficiency. We use the unemployment
rate as an indicator of economic conditions. In municipalities with a higher unemployment
rate, citizens may feel it is more important to improve economic efficiency and
performance. Therefore, reducing inefficiency cost with a more administrative municipal
structure is an optimal choice.
In municipalities that are more dependent on manufacturing industry, the labor
force is comprised of a larger fraction of lower-income and blue-collar groups. In contrast,
in municipalities that rely more on the professional, managerial, scientific, and
administrative industries (PMSA), the labor force is constituted more by the middle- and
upper-class groups. We use the fraction of labor force in the two categories of industries
as indicators of local economic structures.
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Hypothesis 6a: The unemployment rate is positively correlated with
the municipal structure political-administrative index.
Hypothesis 6b: The fraction of the labor force in manufacturing is
negatively correlated with the municipal structure political-administrative
index.
Hypothesis 6c: The fraction of labor force in the professional,
managerial, scientific, and administrative industries is positively correlated
with the political-administrative index.
Considering the autonomy of local citizens in choosing their municipal government
structures, we look into the effect of citizens’ authority of initiative, which allows citizens
to place charter, ordinance, or home rule changes on the ballot by collecting a required
number of signatures on petitions. Initiatives can work toward either end of the scale
depending on the local socioeconomic and demographic situations.
Hypotheses 7: The authority of citizens to introduce initiatives is
correlated either positively or negatively with the municipal structure
political-administrative index.

2.6

Methodology
2.6.1 Model Specification
Municipal structure is measured up to three times for each municipality. The

estimation includes pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, random effects, and
fixed effects. Explanatory variables implied by the theory to relate to municipal structure
should also be related through the changes of explanatory variables and municipal structure,
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which are the focus of the random effects and fixed effects models. Both levels and changes
of municipal structure are relevant measures to test the theory.
The municipal structure political-administrative index is modeled as a function of
a series of socioeconomic and demographic factors and one institutional factor that are
discussed in the hypotheses section. The relationship can be specified as follows:
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln[𝑋(𝑖,𝑡−1) ] + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑖,𝑡)
+𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀(𝑖,𝑡)

(1).

The dependent variable is the municipal structure political-administrative index. 𝑋
indicates a vector of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of citizens or
municipalities. We take the natural log of the values of these factors. 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 is a binary
variable that indicates the existence of the initiative. The estimated effects and the intercept
are 𝛽. The year fixed effects 𝜃𝑡 control for national level forces that are constant for all
states in the year, and 𝜀 denotes the error term.
2.6.2 Data
We use data from three sources. The data on municipal structure characteristics are
derived from the national surveys of Municipal Form of Government conducted by ICMA
in 2001, 2006, and 2011. These surveys are by far the most comprehensive resources about
municipal structure characteristics and political institutions (Coate & Knight, 2011). In
each survey year, ICMA mails survey questions to all municipalities with population above
2,500 and to selected ones among the small-sized municipalities. The number of samples
in the three surveys are 7,867, 8,278, and 8,813. The respective number of responding
municipalities are 4,244, 3,864, and 3,566 in the three surveys, representing 53.9%, 46.7%,
and 40.5% of the survey samples.
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Data on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of municipalities in 2000
are collected from the Decennial Census 2000; the corresponding data in 2010 are derived
from the Decennial Census 2010 and the American Community Survey 5-year estimates
in 2010. The Census Bureau provides instructions to make data from the Decennial Census
and American Community Survey multiple-year estimates comparable. We apply the
approach of Coate and Knight (2011) to interpolate the corresponding data in 2005 by using
the data points in 2000 and 2010. We match the socioeconomic and demographic data in
2000, 2005, and 2010 with municipal structure data in 2001, 2006, and 2011.
We only focus on the mayor-council and council-manager municipalities in this
research. To mitigate selection bias among the small-sized municipalities, we delete the
samples with population size below 2,500. After dropping observations with missing
values in the explanatory variables, we obtain a total of 6,777 municipality-year
observations during the sample period. The final dataset is an unbalanced panel because
not every municipality replies to all three surveys. Table 1.4 displays the descriptive
statistics of all explanatory variables.
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Table 1.4 Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables
Variables
Population size
Income inequality
Proportion of blacks (%)
Per capita income (real 2010 dollars)
Unemployment rate (%)
Labor force in industry of manufacturing (%)
Labor force in industry of PMSA (%)
Educational attainment (high school and above) (%)
Proportion of foreign-born citizens (%)
Existence of initiative (dummy)
Year (2001, 2006, 2011)
Region (Northeast, North Central, South, West)

N
6,777
6,777
6,777
6,777
6,777
6,777
6,777
6,777
6,777
6,777
6,777
6,777
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Mean
28884
1.28
8.76
27303.07
6.67
13.82
8.62
83.53
8.40
0.58
2005.63
2.66

S.D.
80968.65
0.15
14.47
13054.75
3.44
7.83
4.25
9.96
9.21
0.49
4.10
0.94

Min
2501
0.99
0.01
6696.00
0.30
0.25
0.40
22.40
0.05
0
2001
1

Max
3694820
2.53
95.96
142341.70
41.70
82.60
29.80
100
74.70
1
2011
4

2.7

Empirical Findings
We first use cross-sectional ordinary least squares to estimate the model in equation

(1). The results are displayed in column (1) in table 1.5. Over 17% of the variation of the
municipal structure political-administrative index is captured by the explanatory variables,
and many estimated effects are statistically significant at conventional levels. The more
administrative municipal structure is correlated with smaller population size, smaller
fraction of blacks, higher per capita income, higher unemployment rate, higher level of
educational attainment, larger fraction of foreign-born citizens, and citizens’ authority of
initiative. Signs of coefficients of all factors that exert statistically significant effects are
consistent with hypotheses, except the fraction of foreign-born citizens. Results in table 1.5
also show that regions of municipalities are correlated with their municipal structures.
Compared to municipalities in the Northeastern U.S., municipalities in the North Central,
South, and West are more likely to use a more administrative structure, which is consistent
with previous findings.8

8

We also tried to use state dummies, instead of region dummies, in the OLS regression because
municipalities may have same in-state variations but different cross-state variations. Effects of the
explanatory variables are similar to that presented in column (1) in table 1.5.
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Table 1.5 Estimation Results
(1)
OLS

(2)
Random Effects

(3)
Fixed Effects

-0.0717***
(0.0116)
-0.0377
(0.105)
-0.0140*
(0.00828)
0.190***
(0.0540)
0.0928***
(0.0269)
-0.0228
(0.0172)
0.00541
(0.0294)
0.530***
(0.125)
0.141***
(0.0132)
0.232***
(0.0217)
-0.0228
(0.0249)
-0.0236
(0.0275)
0.300***
(0.0395)
0.737***
(0.0375)
0.758***
(0.0404)

-0.0438***
(0.0140)
-0.0104
(0.103)
-0.00529
(0.00904)
0.237***
(0.0497)
0.0258
(0.0202)
-0.0138
(0.0193)
-0.0241
(0.0261)
0.382***
(0.123)
0.106***
(0.0131)
0.0572***
(0.0169)
-0.0328***
(0.0119)
-0.00576
(0.0158)
0.245***
(0.0470)
0.666***
(0.0442)
0.805***
(0.0484)

0.0737
(0.0614)
0.208
(0.155)
0.0317
(0.0202)
0.199*
(0.101)
1.31e-05
(0.0242)
0.0479
(0.0378)
-0.0390
(0.0356)
0.230
(0.237)
0.0147
(0.0229)
-0.0148
(0.0202)
-0.0237
(0.0146)
0.0142
(0.0213)

-4.540***
(0.510)

-4.342***
(0.541)

-3.858**
(1.555)

VARIABLES
Log_Population size
Log_Income inequality
Log_Proportion of blacks (%)
Log_Per capita income
Log_Unemployment rate (%)
Log_Labor force in manufacturing (%)
Log_Labor force in PMSA (%)
Log_Educational attainment (%)
Log_Proportion of foreign-born citizens (%)
Initiative
Year_2006 (2001 as reference group)
Year_2011 (2001 as reference group)
North Central (Northeast as reference group)
South (Northeast as reference group)
West (Northeast as reference group)

Constant

Observations
6,777
6,777
6,777
R-squared
0.173
0.014
Municipality fixed effects
No
No
Yes
Year dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Number of groups
4,135
4,135
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Even controlling for a group of explanatory variables in the model, some
unobserved factors, such as local political ideology and cultural preference, may be omitted.
We therefore add the unobserved and time-invariant factors of municipalities, indicated by
𝛼𝑖 , into the specified model:
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln[𝑋(𝑖,𝑡−1) ] + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑖,𝑡)
+𝜃𝑡 + µ(𝑖,𝑡)

(2),

where
µ(𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀(𝑖,𝑡)

(3).

Random effects estimation assumes the unobserved and time-invariant municipal
characteristics 𝛼𝑡 are uncorrelated with other explanatory factors. However, because the
time-invariant term 𝛼𝑖 exists in the composite error term, µ𝑖,𝑡 is serially correlated across
time. The random effect method, which applies generalized least squares (GLS), can
produce unbiased and consistent estimated effects (Wooldridge, 2015), which are
displayed in column (2) in table 1.5. Signs of estimated effects remain unchanged (except
the labor force in PMSA, whose effect is not statistically significant), but statistical
significance of some variables disappears after controlling for observed and unobserved
municipal characteristics. Compared to results in column (1), the proportion of blacks and
unemployment rate produce no statistically significant effects now. The effects of
population size, per capita income, educational attainment of citizens, proportion of
citizens born in foreign nations, and citizens’ initiative are statistically significant, and the
sign of their effects are consistent with hypotheses (except the fraction of foreign-born
citizens). As with the results in column (1), compared to municipalities in the Northeastern
U.S., the ones in other three regions are more likely to use the administrative structure.
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Last, under the strictest assumption, municipality fixed effects estimation allows
the unobserved and time-invariant variable, 𝛼𝑖 , to be correlated with other explanatory
factors. The estimated effects using ordinary least squares and random effects are biased
when there is a correlation between 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑋(𝑖,𝑡−1) or 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑖,𝑡) . We use the
municipality fixed effects to estimate the specified model, and only changes are used for
estimation. The results displayed in column (3) in table 1.5 indicate the effects of changes
of the explanatory factors on the change of the municipal structure political-administrative
index.
Changes of structural characteristics of the samples are seldom and in small-scale
during the research period (2001-2011), making the variation of the municipal structure
political-administrative index small. The infrequency and small-scale of municipal
structure index change partly explains the elimination of many statistically significant
effects in the fixed effects estimation results. In column (3), only the effect of per capita
income is still statistically significant. A higher per capita income leads to municipalities
adopting structures that are more administrative, which is consistent with the hypothesis
and prior studies. This finding demonstrates the important role citizens’ income level plays
in determining structural changes of municipalities. The findings mean that the model does
a better job of accounting for variation in the cross section than it does accounting for
longitudinal changes of municipal structures.
2.8

Conclusions
Conventional wisdom holds that the shift of municipal structures from the mayor-

council to the council-manager form began in the early twentieth century and continued
until the 1950s, after which the balance between these two forms remained stable (Choi,
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Feiock, & Bae, 2013; Knoke, 1982). However, based on the Municipal Form of
Government surveys conducted by ICMA every five years from 1981 to 2011, we find that
the proportion of the mayor-council form was still declining, reaching the lowest point at
33% in 2011. In the same year, the fraction of council-manager municipalities increased to
around 59%.
Another conspicuous trend in municipal structure adaptations is the development of
the “Type III City” when municipalities on each of the two statutory platforms adopt
characteristics of the other (Frederickson & Johnson, 2001; Frederickson, Johnson, &
Wood, 2004a, 2004b; Frederickson, Wood, & Logan, 2001). The boundary between the
statutory forms becomes ambiguous. Research can revisit municipal structures by
observing details in composition of the structure and further explore their determinants
because municipal structures still matter (Nelson & Svara, 2012).
We examine seven essential components that can distinguish municipal structures
and construct a political-administrative index of municipal structures. Examining the
determinants of municipal structures on the political-administrative dimension is the main
purpose of this research.
We summarize the political conflict theory and class cleavage theory from the related
literature and incorporate these theories into our theoretical model of cost analysis. Citizens
presumably would like a local government that can be both accountable and efficient.
However, pursuing one goal will give rise to increasing cost in the other. The political
municipal structure provides the best approach for citizens to make public officials
accountable and supplies multiple channels for citizens to express demands and safeguard
their benefits, but community policy making or implementation interrupted by frequent
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political conflicts may cause efficiency loss. Alternatively, an administrative structure has
the potential to achieve efficiency due to professional management, but the concentration
of authority in the council and the insulation of the appointed professional manager from
ballot pressure may lead to insufficient ability of citizens to monitor public officials’
behavior.
We argue that citizens with various socioeconomic and demographic backgrounds
have different preferences towards accountability and efficiency and the corresponding
monitoring and inefficiency costs. Citizens will tend to choose a municipal structure that
minimizes the total of the two types of cost. We collect data and use multiple methods to
test our hypotheses. Empirical results demonstrate that the municipal structure politicaladministrative index is tightly associated with citizens’ socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics, most of which are consistent with our predictions and previous studies.
Regarding the changes in municipal structures during the sample period, we find from the
model controlling for municipality fixed effects that municipalities that have higher per
capita income are more likely to adapt toward the administrative structure.
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CHAPTER 3. MUNICIPAL STRUCTURE MATTERS: EVIDENCE FROM GOVERNMENT FISCAL
PERFORMANCE
3.1

Introduction
Municipal structure or form is a basic institutional setting that plays an essential role

in organizing local politics and influencing public policy formulation and implementation
(Judd and Swanstrom 2015; Wheeland, Palus, and Wood 2014; Zhang 2014; Zhang and
Feiock 2009).9 Most U.S. municipalities use either the mayor-council or council-manager
municipal form. 10 Based on the traditional wisdom, in mayor-council municipalities, the
mayor, as the chief executive officer, is separate from the council and is elected directly
by voters; the mayor runs administrative affairs; and the council is responsible for
legislation. In addition, council members are usually elected by district and on a partisan
basis. In council-manager municipalities, the council runs both administration and
legislation; the council usually appoints a professional manager as the chief administrative
officer (CAO) to manage administrative affairs; and the mayor is a ceremonial position
selected by council members on a rotating basis. The council-manager form is generally
associated with the nonpartisan and at-large election of council members.
After the 1950s, cross-adoption of structural characteristics between mayor-council
and council-manager municipalities was prevalent (Choi, Feiock, and Bae 2013), which

9

Many studies use the concepts of municipal form and municipal structure interchangeably. This study refers
to municipal form as the statutory nominal municipal form such as the mayor-council and council-manager.
Municipal structure is a broader concept, which involves the elements of municipal form and other structural
characteristics. Details on the differentiations between these two concepts are discussed later.
10

There are three other statutory nominal municipal forms: commission, town meeting, and representative
town meeting. These forms are adopted by a small group of municipalities mainly located in the New England
states. According to the Municipal Form of Government surveys by ICMA, 9.7%, 9.7%, 8.0%, 6.7%, 7.6%,
6.7%, and 8.0% of the responding municipalities adopted these three forms in 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001,
2006, and 2011, respectively. Like previous studies, this research only involves municipalities with the
mayor-council and council-manager forms in the analysis.
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motivated scholars to reclassify municipal form. An important contribution of this research
is the construction of a municipal structure political-administrative index based on several
essential

structural

characteristics

that

determine

governments’

managerial

professionalism, separation of powers, checks and balances between officials, and local
electoral systems.
An on-going literature attempts to evaluate the consequences in government
performance of variations in municipal form or structure. Carr (2015) systematically
reviews the extant studies and summarizes ten propositions about the relationship between
municipal form and government representation and functionality. He concludes that
evidence on the fundamental assumption that municipal form makes a difference in
government performance is still relatively small and weaker than many might expect. Carr
(2015) encourages scholars to advance research in two approaches: developing a theory to
explain how municipal form matters in government performance and producing empirical
evidence to assess the theory. This article practices these approaches through (1)
theoretically linking municipal structure to government performance based on the rich
literature on government management and performance and (2) empirically investigating
if variations in municipal structure matter in government fiscal performance.
The key research question in this article is whether and how municipal structure
affects government fiscal conditions. The next section briefly introduces prior works on
government fiscal conditions. Section two constructs a municipal structure politicaladministrative index. Section three proposes hypotheses based on theoretical analyses.
Section four introduces the methodology. Section five discusses the empirical findings,
and the last section concludes.
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3.2

Related Literature on Government Fiscal Conditions
Most studies in the related literature focus on the measurement of government fiscal

conditions, validity and reliability of fiscal condition indicators, determinants of
government fiscal conditions, and consequences of and countermeasures to fiscal crises.
So far, there are no universally accepted reliable and valid indicators of government
fiscal conditions. Among a variety of existing measurements, the most frequently cited
include the Fiscal Trend Monitoring System (FTMS) by the International City/County
Management Association (ICMA) (Groves, Godsey, and Shulman 1981; Nollenberger
2003), Brown’s 10-point test and the revised edition (Brown 1993; Maher and
Nollenberger 2009), the four-solvency approach by Wang, Dennis, and Tu (2007), and the
10-point scale approach by Kloha, Weissert, and Kleine (2005). These indicators capture
a comprehensive picture of government fiscal conditions by examining the revenue,
expenditure, budgetary balance, debt, long-term liability, and asset maintenance (Gorina,
Maher, and Joffe 2018).
In-depth understanding of the determinants of government fiscal conditions assists
officials in effectively resolving fiscal problems (Coe 2008; Maher and Deller 2007,
2013a). McDonald (2015) constructs a government fiscal condition determinants model in
an open system framework that involves explanatory factors of politics, economics,
demographics, and government characteristics. The empirical results show the partisan
affiliation of registered voters, educational attainment and income level of local citizens,
the unemployment rate, racial composition of citizens, government revenue sources,
population size, and the charter form of county governments matter for Florida counties’
fiscal conditions.
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Gorina, Maher, and Joffe (2018) construct an action-based measure of local
government fiscal distress. The authors operationalize fiscal distress as “actions, often
disruptive and politically unpopular, that a government takes because it is unable to meet
its fundamental operating needs and service requirements.” (p. 81). The authors use a
variety of indicators that are commonly employed by scholars as the direct measurements
of government fiscal conditions, such as cash solvency, budgetary solvency, and long-term
solvency, to predict governments’ certain disruptive and politically unpopular actions.
Jimenez (2017) investigates the effect of managerial networking on the fiscal health
of local governments from a perspective of the management-performance linkage. His
results demonstrate a concave relationship between the managerial networking of city
managers and government budgetary solvency. City managers’ ties with external
stakeholders do help improve governments’ budgetary solvency at the beginning. But too
frequent interactions with external stakeholders constrain managers’ decisions in fiscal
management and exacerbate government fiscal difficulties.
There are many limitations in the literature on the determinants of government fiscal
conditions. Research samples in empirical studies are often derived from one single or a
few states (Gorina, Maher, and Joffe 2018; McDonald 2015). Usage of one-year crosssectional data is common (Maher and Deller 2013b). Moreover, few previous studies apply
the rich literature on government management and performance to explain the effect of
municipal structure on government fiscal conditions (Carr 2015; Ingraham, Joyce, and
Donahue 2003). This research advances the related literature in these aspects.
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3.3

Measuring Municipal Structure on a Political-Administrative Scale
Municipal structure is the explanatory variable of interest in the determinant model

of government fiscal conditions in this research. Previous studies generally adopt a binary
variable to indicate the primary municipal structure as the mayor-council or councilmanager. However, prevalent cross-adoption of structural characteristics between
municipalities makes a dichotomous classification problematic. Scholars have attempted
to use different methods to reclassify municipal form into multiple categories based on a
variety of structural characteristics (Carr and Karuppusamy 2008, 2009, 2010; DeSantis
and Renner 2002; Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2004a, 2004b; Hansell 1999; Nelson
and Svara 2010).
Nelson and Svara (2010) assert the importance of distinguishing adaptation of
municipal models versus variation in municipal form at the conceptual level. In their
viewpoint, the municipal model involves elements that not only characterize municipal
form but differentiate local electoral systems and other structural characteristics. In this
vein, municipal model is a broader concept than municipal form. The typology of Nelson
and Svara (2010) starts from the stated nominal mayor-council or council-manager
municipal form and examines three structural features: how the mayor is selected, whether
a CAO exists, and who appoints the CAO. They classify the mayor-council form into four
categories: mayor and council-administrator, mayor-council-administrator, mayoradministrator-council, and classic mayor-council. The council-manager form is classified
into three categories: council (mayor)-manager, mayor-council-manager, and empowered
mayor council-manager. The seven categories of municipal form “represent a progression
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from low centralized political leadership and high professional autonomy to high political
leadership and low professional autonomy.” (Nelson and Svara 2010, p. 558).
Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004a, 2004b) and Carr and Karuppusamy (2008,
2009, 2010) classify municipal structure by examining a broader range of structural
characteristics, including all the elements examined by Nelson and Svara (2010), features
of the electoral system, allocation of powers, among other characteristics. The “Type III
City” framework of Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004a, 2004b) classifies municipal
structure into three groups: the political, the administrative, and the adapted structure. Carr
and Karuppusamy (2008, 2009, 2010) modify the “Type III City” framework and classify
the mayor-council form into the political, the adapted political, and the conciliated political,
and classify the council-manager form into the conciliated administrative, the adapted
administrative, and the administrative. The nature of these reclassified municipal forms
ranges in an order from the most political to the most administrative.
3.3.1 Municipal Structure Political-Administrative Index
The approach to classify municipal structure in this article absorbs merits of the
two previous typologies. Applying the terminology of Nelson and Svara (2010), the focus
is more on the adaptation of municipal models than the variation of municipal form itself.
Therefore, the theory here does not claim to classify the municipal form in the conventional
sense. Instead, the typology aims to involve the most essential structural characteristics that
determine the managerial professionalism, assignment of powers, and local electoral
systems to measure the nature of municipal structure on a political-administration scale.
Table 2.1 presents the seven structural characteristics that are examined. The number of
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municipalities in the sample (N=6,786) with each structural characteristic is reported in
parentheses.
Table 2.1 Standards of constructing the municipal structure political-administrative index
Structural characteristics\coded values
Stated nominal form

0
Mayor-council
(N=2,544)

Existence of Chief Administrative Officer

0.5

1
Council-manager
(N=4,242)

No
(N=1,062)

Yes
(N=5,724)

Direct election
(N= 5,539)

Non-direct election
(N=1,247)

Mayor is independent of council

Yes
(N=2,144)

No
(N=4,642)

Authority of mayor to veto council decisions

Yes
(N=2,058)

No
(N=4,728)

Partisan or nonpartisan election of council members

Partisan
(N=1,047)

Nonpartisan
(N=5,739)

At-large or by-district election of council members

By-district
(N=1,138)

Mayor election method

Combination
(N=1,453)

At-large
(N=4,195)

The stated nominal form, mayor-council or council-manager, is the statutory
structural setting. The other six structural characteristics measure three dimensions of the
political or administrative nature of municipal structure. The election method of the mayor,
independence of the mayor from the council, and the veto power of the mayor on council
decisions determine the separation of powers and checks and balances between officials.
The existence of a CAO characterizes the degree of managerial professionalism. The two
features of the election of council members measure the influence of parties and special
interests on local elections.
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Each structural characteristic is assigned a numerical value (0, 0.5, or 1), with a
lower value indicating the more political nature and a higher value indicating the more
administrative nature. Factor analysis (refer to table 2.3) of the seven coded values
produces a municipal structure political-administrative index. A lower index indicates a
more political municipal structure and a higher index means a more administrative
municipal structure. Data on municipalities’ structural characteristics are collected from
the Municipal Form of Government surveys by ICMA in 2001, 2006, and 2011. Among all
municipality samples in the dataset, the municipal structure political-administrative index
ranges from -1.92 to 1.72 with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.86.
3.3.2 Index Reliability
The common method to assess the reliability of an index is to evaluate its
“dependability, stability, consistency, reproducibility and lack of distortion.” (Kerlinger
and Lee 2000). The seven components of municipal structure index are objective features
for assessing the political or administrative nature of municipal structure. Municipality
samples in ICMA’s surveys are selected based on their population size. In each survey year,
ICMA mails survey questions to all municipalities with population size above 2,500 and
to selected small-sized municipalities. To mitigate selection bias, only the municipalities
with population size above 2,500 are included in the analysis. The response rates of
ICMA’s surveys in 2001, 2006, and 2011 are around 50%. The data for constructing the
index are accessible from ICMA. Therefore, the results are reproducible. The form of
ICMA’s survey questions is uniform across time. This improves the uniformity and
consistency of the data sources. Moreover, ICMA’s surveys have been conducted every
five years. Time series data make the index more dependable (Clark 2015).
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A useful technique to assess reliability of an index is to evaluate the correlation
between index components. Table 2.2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for each
pair of the index components in sample and the statistical significance level. The
components are positively correlated with each other at the 0.01 level, providing strong
evidence of reliability.
Table 2.2 Correlation matrix of index components
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
1
0.5445***
1
0.3352*** 0.1887***
1
0.4834*** 0.3311*** 0.3118***
1
0.4731*** 0.3291*** 0.2907*** 0.5839***
1
0.3164*** 0.2663*** 0.1258*** 0.2055***
0.1992***
1
0.2225*** 0.1814*** 0.1835*** 0.2897***
0.3070***
0.1168*** 1
Notes: Sample size is 6,786. ***p<0.01. a = stated nominal form; b = existence of
Chief Administrative Officer; c = mayor election method; d = mayor is independent of
council; e = authority of mayor to veto council decisions; f = partisan or nonpartisan
election of council members; g = at-large or by-district election of council members.

a
b
c
d
e
f
g

Another technique to evaluate the reliability of an index is to calculate the value of
Cronbach’s alpha, which ranges between 0 and 1, with a higher value indicating a closer
correlation between components of an index (Clark 2015). The value of Cronbach’s alpha
is 0.76, indicating an acceptable reliability of the municipal structure index (Berman and
Wang 2017).
3.3.3 Index Validity
“With validity, the goal is to figure out if we are measuring the concept that we
intended to measure.” (Clark 2015, p. 72). Validity of the index is assessed in three aspects:
content validity, criterion-related validity, and construct validity.
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Content validity requires that components of the index should include all possible
items that can measure the core concept (Kerlinger and Lee 2000), and there should be
evidence from the literature demonstrating the efficacy of these items in measuring the
concept. The requirement of “all possible items” is extremely strict that can be satisfied
only theoretically. There may be dozens of potential index components (structural
characteristics). However, it is necessary to balance thoroughness with parsimony and to
consider data availability. The seven components involved in classifying municipal
structure are well discussed in the literature. Therefore, it is safe to use them to construct
the municipal structure index.
Criterion-related validity requires the constructed index to be correlated with other
potential measures of the same concept. The stated nominal municipal form, mayor-council
or council-manager, is traditionally used as a binary measurement of municipal structure.
In the traditional wisdom, the former is a political structure and the latter is an
administrative structure. The positive and statistically significant correlations between the
stated nominal municipal form with the other index components, which are reported in the
first column in table 2.2, support the criterion-related validity of the index.
Construct validity is usually assessed by theoretically relating components of the
index to the concept to be measured. Also, construct validity asks “which factors account
for the variance in performance of the thing we are trying to measure?” (Clark 2015, p. 73).
The grounds on which the seven structural characteristics have political or administrative
nature have been discussed thoroughly by previous studies. The more political municipal
structure underscores separation of powers and checks and balances between the mayor
and council members, direct responsiveness and accountability of the mayor to voters, and
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influence of parties and special interests on local elections. To the contrary, the more
administrative municipal structure highlights professional management of municipal
affairs, concentration of powers in the council, and elimination of partisan and special
interests’ influence on elections.
Finally, factor analysis is used to assess whether the seven components of the
municipal structure index are appropriately loaded. Factor analysis reports only one factor
with an eigenvalue greater than one (2.24), demonstrating that the components of the index
measure a single core concept. Factor loadings of the principal factor are presented in table
2.3. The principal factor has positive loadings for all the seven components, among which
the stated nominal form, existence of a CAO, whether the mayor is independent of the
council, and authority of the mayor to veto council decisions are highly loaded.
Table 2.3 Loadings of the principal factor after factor analysis
Index components
Stated nominal form
Existence of Chief Administrative Officer
Mayor selection method
Mayor is independent of council
Authority of mayor to veto council decisions
Partisan or nonpartisan election of council members
At-large or by-district election of council members
3.4

Principal Factor Uniqueness
0.7319
0.4304
0.5681
0.6062
0.4211
0.8159
0.6870
0.4928
0.6798
0.4996
0.3566
0.8377
0.3747
0.8368

Theoretical Analyses and Hypotheses
We can propose at least three reasons that municipal structure might affect

government performance. Municipal structure ought to affect the managerial
professionalism of government. Professionalism and officials’ behavior motivation in turn
can affect governments’ managerial strategy stance. Finally, municipal structure ought to
affect the relative attention of officials to managerial efficiency versus accountability.
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3.4.1 Managerial Professionalism and Government Performance
The administrative municipal structure is characterized by the existence of expert
managers (CAOs) in the managerial system. Previous studies have found the important role
of and the substantial degree of professional autonomy held by the CAO in policy making
and implementation (Demir and Reddick 2012; Nalbandian 1999; Nelson and Svara 2015;
Selden, Brewer, and Brudney 1999; Zhang 2014; Zhang and Feiock 2010).
Differentiations in the career path and primary behavior motivation of elected
officials and appointed professional managers result in different degrees of managerial
professionalism in dealing with government affairs. The primary motivation of elected
officials, whose career is generally determined by vote results in elections, is to win
popularity by catering to voters’ demands. Thus, acting responding to the dynamic
preferences of voters is presumably the most essential part of their works. The political
motivation of catering to groups that can contribute more political support encourages
elected officials to invest a substantial amount of resources in public programs that might
not produce the maximum level of marginal benefits and, hence, creates government
inefficiencies.
However, the appointed CAO must focus on not only voters’ demands, which are
expressed through mandates of elected officials, but also the pressure of building an
outstanding reputation among peers in professional organizations, such as the International
City/County Management Association and Government Finance Officers Association
(Dunn and Legge 2001). Local governments usually select professional managers based on
their managerial experiences and reputations. For the appointed professional managers, the
presumably most important task is to search for innovations and improve managerial skills
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to solve local problems. Moreover, appointed managers are usually trained experts who are
equipped with managerial knowledge and information advantages, which facilitate
government management in a more professional way.
Managerial professionalism promotes government fiscal performance via
improving the quality of budget making, capital planning, investment of public funds, and
usage of debt financing. Professional managers are presumably more capable of preparing
government budgets based on the generally accepted accounting principles, forecasting
revenues and expenditures accurately with advanced techniques, implementing multipleyear budgeting and capital plans, making using of capital markets more reasonably, and
diversifying revenue sources strategically. These capacities have great potentials to
improve government fiscal performance.
3.4.2 Managerial Strategy Stance and Government Performance
Organizational performance is the result of interaction between external
environments and internal strategic management (Boyne and Walker 2010). Factors of the
external environment, such as the population size, racial and ethnic characteristics of
citizens, and local political ideology, are generally beyond the control of government
officials. What officials are at discretion to a larger extent is the adjustment of strategic
management in running the government. Boyne and Walker (2004) develop a strategy
content matrix along two dimensions: strategy stances and strategy actions. The former
refers to the generic approach that describes organizations’ position and how they respond
to environments to maintain or improve their performance, and the latter identifies the
range of specific actions by organizations to operationalize the strategy stance (Andrews,
Boyne, and Walker 2006; Boyne and Walker 2004).
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Boyne and Walker (2004) classify the strategy stance of public organizations into
prospecting, defending, and reacting. Prospectors are more likely to be pioneers and search
for innovations and new approaches to deal with emerging environmental trends (Andrews,
Boyne, and Walker 2006). Defenders usually take a conservative viewpoint toward
innovations and “focus on a narrow range of services, their core activities, to retain their
existing portfolio of activities and protect their share of the public budget from attacks by
predatory organizations.” (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006, p. 53). Lastly, reactors
generally do not maintain a consistent stance in organizational operation and tend to adjust
strategies according to the dynamic environmental pressures (Boyne and Walker 2004).
Previous studies have found a positive correlation between prospecting and public
organizations’ performance (Andrews et al. 2005; Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006) and
a negative relationship between reacting and the performance of public organizations
(Andrews et al. 2008; Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006).
Under the more political municipal structure, separation of powers forces the mayor
and council members to negotiate and compromise with each other in order to achieve their
desired policy goals. Council members selected on a partisan and district basis have a
higher motivation to cater to special interest groups and political supporters in specific
districts, and they are inclined to be more sensitive to external political pressures from
parties and demands of voters. Officials under the more political municipal structure will
be more likely to be reactors in strategy stance. In contrast, under the administrative
municipal structure with unified powers concentrated in the council, collaboration inside
the managerial system and assistance from professional managers in government operating
facilitate adoption of innovations (Nelson and Svara 2012). In municipalities where at-
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large elections are implemented and partisan influence is eliminated, professional
autonomy is promoted. Therefore, officials are more likely to adopt innovative managerial
practices and techniques, and they can be presumably described as prospectors in strategy
stance. The theoretical linkage between municipal structure and strategy stance together
with empirical evidence on the correlation between strategy stance and government
performance imply that municipalities with a more administrative structure will have better
fiscal performance.
Based on the two mechanisms described, there may be a linear relationship between
the constructed municipal structure political-administrative index and indicators of
government fiscal performance. Higher index values are correlated with a higher degree of
managerial professionalism and a higher probability of adopting prospecting in managerial
strategy stance and, thus, better government fiscal performance.
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive correlation between the municipal
structure political-administrative index and government fiscal conditions,
all else being equal.
3.4.3 Managerial Accountability versus Efficiency
Accountability here is defined as the responsiveness and adherence of public
officials to citizens’ preferences for public policies and demands for public services (Dunn
and Legge 2001). Like many previous studies, this article defines efficiency as the capacity
of government officials in improving professional management to enhance public resource
utilization (Hayes and Chang 1990). Managerial efficiency makes it feasible for
governments to spend fewer resources to provide a certain amount of public services.
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Accountability of public officials to citizens helps mitigate the agency problem and prevent
government corruption.
Assume that an optimal municipal structure that is potentially correlated with best
government performance can delegate government management to professional experts for
efficiency gains while holding public officials accountable to citizens (Putnam, Leonardi,
and Nanetti 1994; Shepsle 1988). Under a more administrative or professional municipal
structure, delegating government management to expert managers can potentially improve
managerial efficiency (Deno and Mehay 1987; Hayes and Chang 1990). However, it
increases the difficulty of holding the managers accountable because they are not placed
under the direct ballot pressure of voters and they hold information and skill advantages
over voters and elected officials. Meanwhile, concentration of powers in the council
weakens checks and balances between the mayor and council members. Therefore, voters’
monitoring cost over officials increases. On the other hand, under a more political
municipal structure, government management by the directly elected officials, who tend to
put priority on political responsiveness and winning elections, helps assure accountability.
However, managerial inefficiency may raise due to insufficient professional management
and increasing political struggles. In this vein, an optimal municipal structure may be the
one that mixes the political and administrative structural characteristics in combination.
Similar inference is obtained in the analysis of managerial strategy stance.
Although there is evidence showing that reacting is detrimental to organizational
performance, it may not be the worst strategy stance for governments because of their
public nature. Actively adopting innovations by prospectors can potentially improve
managerial practices, but failure to respond in a timely way to environmental dynamics
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may result in accountability problem, loss of political support, and poor policy performance.
In contrast, reactors may be hesitant to innovate, but their adherence to political principals
and prompt adjustments of actions in accordance with external environments help them
achieve more political support and prevent risks. Therefore, a strategy stance that mixes
prospecting and reacting may combine advantages from both and lead to best government
performance.
Hypothesis 2: There is a curvilinear relationship between the
municipal structure political-administrative index and government fiscal
conditions, presenting an inverted U-shaped relationship, all else being
equal.
Local governments’ fiscal conditions are shaped by the external environment
interacted with internal government management (Cabaleiro, Buch, and Vaamonde 2013;
Hendrick 2004). In addition to the direct effect of municipal structure on governments’
fiscal performance, municipal structure can interact with factors of external environments
to exert indirect or moderating effect.
Hypothesis 3: The municipal structure political-administrative
index moderates the effects of external environmental factors on
government fiscal conditions, all else being equal.

3.5

Methodology
3.5.1 Model Specification
Indicators of fiscal conditions are first modeled as a function of the direct effect of

municipal structure and control variables to test Hypothesis 1.
𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
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(1).

𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 refers to indicators of government fiscal conditions in municipality 𝑖 and in
year 𝑡 . 𝑆𝐸 , 𝐹 , 𝐼 , and 𝑆 indicate the factors of socioeconomic characteristics of
municipalities or citizens, fiscal environments, institutional constraints, and the municipal
structure political-administrative index, respectively. The intercept is α, the estimated
parameters are 𝛽, γ, δ, λ, and the error term is 𝜀. The explanatory variables take a one-year
lag.11
Model (1) is expanded to include a square of the municipal structure index to test
the inverted U-shaped relationship in Hypothesis 2.
2
𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆1 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆2 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(2).

The multiplicative interaction regression model is used to test Hypothesis 3. All the
factors of the external environment (socioeconomic, fiscal, and institutional) can interact
with the municipal structure index. All constitutive terms of the interaction items should
be included in the multiplicative interaction model (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2005).
𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿1 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(3).

3.5.2 Data Collection
Data on municipal structural characteristics are derived from the Municipal Form
of Government national surveys conducted by ICMA in 2001, 2006, and 2011. The survey
samples in 2001, 2006, and 2011 are 7,867, 8,278, and 8,813, respectively, with response
rates around 50%.

11

Some of the socioeconomic and fiscal variables have a two-year lag instead of one (see the section on data
collection).
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Data on socioeconomic characteristics in 2000 are collected from the Decennial
Census 2000. The corresponding data in 2010 are collected from the Decennial Census
2010 and supplemented by the American Community Survey 5-year estimates in 2010. The
Census Bureau provides instructions for merging data accurately from these two sources.
Data in 2005 are linearly interpolated using data points in 2000 and 2010, which is a
commonly used data processing method (Coate and Knight 2011). Government finance
data are collected from the U.S. Census Bureau government finance surveys in 2002, 2007,
and 2012. In years ending with 2 and 7, the surveys cover almost all municipalities.
The government fiscal condition indicators are calculated based on the Census
government finance data. The Census government finance data in 2002 are matched with
municipal structure data in 2001 and Census socioeconomics data in 2000. The
corresponding data in 2007, 2006, and 2005 are matched, as are the corresponding data in
2012, 2011, and 2010.
Part of the fiscal (governmental functions in public health, social service, and public
school) and institutional (balanced budget requirement and debt limit) factors are coded
according to Krane, Rigos, and Hill (2001). The data are coded based on state-imposed
regulations on municipalities. In addition, data on the tax and expenditure limitations
(TELs) stringency index are collected and updated based on Amiel, Deller, and Stallmann
(2009).
Like most previous studies, only the mayor-council and council-manager
municipalities with population size over 2,500 are involved in the analysis to mitigate
selection bias in the municipal structure surveys. The final dataset is an unbalanced panel
because the Municipal Form of Government survey respondents differ in each survey year.
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3.5.3 Indicators of Government Fiscal Conditions
This article draws on measurements used by previous studies to operationalize
government fiscal conditions. Considering data availability and practical feasibility, a
constructive approach is to select a group of indicators that are commonly used and
intuitively reasonable to capture a comprehensive picture of government fiscal conditions
in several aspects. Government fiscal conditions are measured by four indicators: cash
solvency, dependence on intergovernmental transfers, debt level, and balance of the
operating budget.
Cash solvency manifests governments’ ability to realize liquidity to provide public
services in the short-term. Per capita total cash and securities at the end of a fiscal year is
used as an indicator of municipal governments’ cash solvency. A higher value of the
indicator signals healthier fiscal conditions. The percentage of intergovernmental revenues
to total revenues is an indicator of dependence on intergovernmental transfers. Undue
reliance on revenues from other governments damages fiscal autonomy and presumably
indicates a weaker ability of the government to provide public services and fulfil fiscal
obligations using its own resources. Therefore, a lower value of the percentage reflects
healthier fiscal conditions. Governments usually resort to the capital market to maintain
normal operating of the government or to fund capital projects. The ratio of total debt
outstanding at the end of a fiscal year to general revenues is an applicable indicator of debt
level. A lower value of the ratio indicates healthier fiscal conditions. Balance of the
operating budget reflects the ability of governments to collect sufficient revenues to
provide mandatory general services in a fiscal year. The focus in this article is the operating
budget, excluding the capital budget which generally involves a multiple-year capital plan
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and is funded by the long-term debt. The operating budget balance is measured as the
percentage of general budget surplus or deficit to general revenues. An operating budget
surplus indicates healthier fiscal conditions.
3.5.4 Control Variables
Selection of control variables is based on evidence from previous studies and data
availability. The factors of socioeconomics include the population size, mean household
income, unemployment rate, fraction of residents above 65 years old, and local industrial
structures. These factors affect government fiscal conditions by determining government
revenue collections and spending needs (Hendrick 2004; Jacob and Hendrick 2012).
Particularly, the industrial structure is measured by the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI)
expressed as follows (Suyderhoud 1994):
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =

1−(∑𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 )
1−

1
𝑛

2

(3),

where 𝑖 indicates municipality, 𝑡 refers to time, and 𝑋𝑗 specifies the fraction of labor force
in industry 𝑗 out of 𝑛 industries. 12 HHI ranges between 0 and 1, with a higher value
indicating a more diversified industry structure.
The fiscal factors include municipalities’ fiscal functions and revenue structures.
Dummy variables are used to indicate municipalities’ functions in public health, social
services, and public schools to account for variations in service responsibilities of

12

Based on the classification by the Census Bureau, there are thirteen industries in local economies:
agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining; construction; manufacturing; wholesale trade; retail
trade; transportation and warehousing, and utilities; information; finance, insurance, real estate, and rental
and leasing; professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management services;
educational, health and social services; arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services;
other services (except public administration); and public administration.
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municipal governments across states (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001). 13 The model includes
the diversity index (HHI) of municipalities’ general revenues and tax revenues to control
for the effect of revenue diversification on governments’ fiscal conditions. 14
Local governments generally do not possess full fiscal autonomy over their fiscal
behavior (McDonald 2015; Rose 2010). The factors of institutional constraints controlled
for in the estimation model include the TELs stringency index and dummy variables for
the balanced budget requirement (BBR) and debt limit. Descriptive statistics of fiscal
condition indicators and control variables, their measurements, and the data sources are
presented in table 2.4.

13

Krane, Rigos, and Hill (2001) classify municipal government functions into nine categories, including
general government, public safety, public health, public works, social services, economic development,
physical environment, culture and recreation, and public schools. This study controls only three of them in
the model because almost all municipalities across states have functions in the other six categories.
14

Based on the classification by the Census Bureau, the categories of general revenues include
intergovernmental revenues, total taxes, current charges, and miscellaneous general revenues. The categories
of tax revenues include property tax revenues, sale tax revenues, license tax revenues, and others.
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Table 2.4 Variable names, descriptive statistics, and data sources
Variable
N
Mean
Fiscal condition indicators
Cash solvency (real 2013 dollars)
6,767
1454.23
Dependence on intergovernmental transfers (%) 6,750
16.74
Debt level (ratio)
6,579
1.24
Operating budget balance (%)
6,785
1.15
Socioeconomic factors
Population size
6,786
29104
Average household income (real 2013 dollars)
6,786 71257.68
Unemployment rate (%)
6,786
6.72
Fraction of residents over 65 years old (%)
6,786
14.46
Structure of local industries
6,786
0.94
Fiscal factors
Function in public health (dummy)
6,786
0.45
Function in social service (dummy)
6,786
0.37
Function in public school (dummy)
6,786
0.23
Structure of general revenues
6,786
0.81
Structure of tax revenues
6,786
0.51
Institutional factors
BBR (dummy)
6,786
0.62
Debt limit (dummy)
6,786
0.78
TELs stringency index
6,786
20.21

S.D.

Max

Data sources

0 102628.50
0
94.80
0
66.16
-307.86
91.10

CGFD
CGFD
CGFD
CGFD

80186
2501
3694820
36857.98 26223.57 431349.70
3.47
0.30
41.70
5.93
1.44
68.70
0.03
0.34
0.98

DC and ACS
DC and ACS
DC and ACS
DC and ACS
DC and ACS

3061.02
13.19
1.52
21.76

Min

0.50
0.48
0.42
0.14
0.26

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

0.49
0.41
10.58

0
0
0

1
1
38

KRH (2001)
KRH (2001)
KRH (2001)
CGFD
CGFD

KRH (2001)
KRH (2001)
ADS (2009)
Notes: Cash solvency is measured by per capita total cash and securities at the end of a fiscal year. Dependence on intergovernmental
transfers is measured as the percentage of intergovernmental revenues to total revenues. Debt level is measured as the ratio of total debt
outstanding at the end of a fiscal year to general revenues. Operating budget balance is measured as the percentage of general budget surplus or
deficit to general revenues. CGFD: Census government finance dataset; DC: Decennial Census; ACS: American Community Survey multiple-year
estimates; KRH: Krane, Rigos, and Hill (2001); ADS: Amiel, Deller, and Stallmann (2009).
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3.6

Empirical Results
3.6.1 Direct Effect of Municipal Structure
Results of regressing model (1) with year fixed effects and robust standard errors

are presented in the first four columns in Panel A of table 2.5. The dependent variable in
each of the four columns is the four indicators of fiscal conditions, respectively. Column
(1) shows that the municipal structure political-administrative index has a positive and
statistically significant correlation with per capita total cash and securities at the end of a
fiscal year. The index ranges from -1.92 to 1.71. In column (1), the dependent variable
takes a log form. Therefore, holding other explanatory variables constant, when municipal
structure adjusts from the most political to the most administrative, per capita total cash
and securities increased by around 22 percent. Column (2) shows that the municipal
structure

index

is

negatively

correlated

with

governments’

dependence

on

intergovernmental transfers and the effect is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. A
smaller value of the dependent variable in column (2) means healthier fiscal conditions.
Therefore, the results indicate that the administrative municipal structure is associated with
better fiscal performance based on dependence on intergovernmental revenues. Holding
other explanatory variables constant, when municipal structure adjusts from the most
political to the most administrative, the percentage of intergovernmental transfers to total
revenues decreases by about 5 percentage points. Results in columns (3) and (4) show that
the correlations between the municipal structure index and governments’ debt level and
general budget balance are not statistically significant.
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Table 2.5 Direct effect of municipal structure and the inverted U-shaped relationship

VARIABLES

Municipal structure index

Panel A Direct effect of municipal structure (Model 1)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Cash
Intergov.
Debt level
General
solvency
revenue
budget
dependence
Surplus/deficit
0.0602***
-1.275***
0.0312
0.304
(0.0137)
(0.210)
(0.0208)
(0.324)

Panel B Inverted U-shaped relationship test (Model 2)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Cash
Intergov.
Debt level
General
solvency
revenue
budget
dependence
Surplus/deficit
0.0362*
-0.869***
-0.0844**
0.476
(0.0197)
(0.292)
(0.0395)
(0.491)
-0.0322*
0.546*
-0.155***
0.232
(0.0190)
(0.288)
(0.0357)
(0.474)

0.230***
(0.0105)
0.285***
(0.0402)
-0.126***
(0.0287)
0.262***
(0.0287)
-1.399***
(0.400)

-0.0813
(0.158)
0.0850
(0.627)
2.323***
(0.403)
0.192
(0.373)
-1.419
(5.275)

0.0591***
(0.0197)
-0.203***
(0.0622)
-0.145***
(0.0475)
-0.254***
(0.0409)
0.0879
(0.505)

-0.319
(0.247)
1.981*
(1.073)
0.738
(0.699)
-1.762**
(0.762)
-0.669
(8.064)

0.233***
(0.0105)
0.285***
(0.0402)
-0.124***
(0.0287)
0.267***
(0.0289)
-1.417***
(0.400)

-0.128
(0.157)
0.0834
(0.626)
2.297***
(0.403)
0.108
(0.376)
-1.097
(5.273)

0.0725***
(0.0188)
-0.205***
(0.0621)
-0.138***
(0.0478)
-0.231***
(0.0420)
0.00378
(0.509)

-0.340
(0.249)
1.979*
(1.073)
0.727
(0.699)
-1.797**
(0.768)
-0.534
(8.085)

0.0300
(0.0299)
-0.185***
(0.0290)
0.0955***
(0.0276)
0.844***

1.843***
(0.430)
-5.496***
(0.418)
2.037***
(0.453)
13.52***

-0.0268
(0.0402)
0.253***
(0.0386)
0.0147
(0.0427)
0.834***

3.387***
(0.816)
-0.669
(0.788)
-2.298***
(0.748)
-9.294***

0.0329
(0.0300)
-0.188***
(0.0291)
0.0922***
(0.0276)
0.841***

1.795***
(0.433)
-5.455***
(0.420)
2.091***
(0.455)
13.57***

-0.0117
(0.0398)
0.242***
(0.0391)
-0.000722
(0.0430)
0.820***

3.367***
(0.821)
-0.652
(0.793)
-2.274***
(0.744)
-9.277***

Municipal structure index^2
Socioeconomic factors
Population size (log)
Mean household income (log)
Unemployment rate
Fraction of residents over 65
Structure of local industries
Fiscal factors
Function in public health
Function in social service
Function in public school
Structure of general revenues
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Table 2.5 (continued)

Structure of tax revenues
Institutional factors
BBR
Debt limit
TELs stringency index

2006 (2001 as reference)
2011 (2001 as reference)
Constant

(0.108)
-0.110**
(0.0465)

(1.593)
-7.564***
(0.678)

(0.179)
0.0142
(0.0790)

(1.995)
1.762
(1.076)

(0.108)
-0.113**
(0.0466)

(1.592)
-7.510***
(0.676)

(0.178)
-0.00157
(0.0778)

(1.995)
1.784*
(1.074)

-0.118***
(0.0256)
-0.146***
(0.0277)
0.00516***
(0.00111)

-4.106***
(0.357)
-2.029***
(0.419)
-0.134***
(0.0169)

-0.121***
(0.0373)
-0.0913**
(0.0417)
-0.00255
(0.00172)

-1.934***
(0.594)
-0.226
(0.700)
0.0388
(0.0272)

-0.122***
(0.0257)
-0.146***
(0.0277)
0.00546***
(0.00113)

-4.040***
(0.360)
-2.029***
(0.418)
-0.139***
(0.0173)

-0.139***
(0.0385)
-0.0917**
(0.0415)
-0.00115
(0.00181)

-1.906***
(0.598)
-0.226
(0.700)
0.0367
(0.0276)

0.446***
(0.0266)
0.676***
(0.0280)
1.469**
(0.634)

-2.374***
(0.369)
-2.437***
(0.413)
15.15*
(9.078)

0.146***
(0.0471)
0.302***
(0.0546)
3.066***
(0.924)

1.140*
(0.670)
1.161*
(0.659)
-8.180
(14.85)

0.444***
(0.0266)
0.673***
(0.0280)
1.465**
(0.633)

-2.356***
(0.369)
-2.393***
(0.414)
15.19*
(9.079)

0.141***
(0.0476)
0.289***
(0.0557)
3.077***
(0.924)

1.148*
(0.669)
1.181*
(0.660)
-8.143
(14.85)

Observations
R-squared

6,758
6,750
6,579
6,785
6,758
6,750
6,579
6,785
0.205
0.120
0.026
0.015
0.205
0.121
0.029
0.015
Notes: Results in Panel A and B are obtained by estimating models (1) and (2), respectively. Refer to table 2.4 for the
measurements and descriptive statistics of variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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3.6.2 Inverted U-shaped Relationship
Model (2) is estimated to test Hypothesis 2, producing results reported in the last
four columns in Panel B of table 2.5. Column (5) shows that the estimated effects of the
municipal structure index and its square are positive and negative, respectively, and both
are statistically significant. Taken together, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship
between the municipal structure index and government fiscal conditions based on cash
solvency. Figure 2.1 graphically illustrates the correlation to facilitate interpretation. Based
on the coefficients, the curve reaches the peak at the index around 0.56. Figure 2.1
illustrates that as the municipal structure adjusts from the most political to the most
administrative, governments’ cash solvency improves and then declines, presenting an
inverted U-shape. The results support Hypothesis 2.
Figure 2.1 Predicted log of per capita total cash and securities with 95% CI
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Similarly, column (6) shows that the estimated effects of the municipal structure
index and its square are negative and positive, respectively. Both are statistically significant
at conventional levels. Governments’ dependence on intergovernmental transfers declines
until the municipal structure index reaches around 0.80 and then increases. A lower value
of the dependent variable indicates better fiscal conditions. Therefore, the inverted Ushaped correlation between the municipal structure index and government fiscal
performance based on dependence on intergovernmental revenues is supported. Figure 2.2
displays this correlation.
Figure 2.2 Predicted percentage of intergovernmental transfers to total revenues with
95% CI

Results in column (7) indicate that the effects on governments’ debt level of both
the municipal structure index and its square are negative and statistically significant. It
implies that as the municipal structure becomes more administrative, governments’ debt
level declines at an increasing rate. Lastly, results in column (8) in table 2.5 indicate that
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the correlation between the municipal structure index and its square and governments’
general budget balance is not statistically significant.
3.6.3 Moderating Effect of Municipal Structure
The results of estimating model (3) are presented in table 2.6. In the multiplicative
interaction model, effects of the factors of external environments on government fiscal
conditions are contingent on the municipal structure. Similarly, interpreting the effect of
municipal structure independently (for instance, the results reported in the first row in table
2.6) is misleading. Therefore, primary attention is paid to the parameters of the interaction
items to examine the moderating effect of municipal structure. Most of the interaction items,
especially for the first two indicators of fiscal conditions, show statistically significant
estimates at conventional levels. To save space, only the unemployment rate and TELs are
used as examples to discuss. The former is an important indicator of local economic
conditions and the latter is an essential fiscal constraint that can regulate governments’
fiscal behavior.
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Table 2.6 Moderating effect of municipal structure (Model 3)
(1)
Cash
solvency
Municipal structure index
Socioeconomic factors
Population size (log)
Population size × index
Mean household income (log)
Mean household income × index
Unemployment rate
Unemployment rate × index
Fraction of residents over 65
Fraction of residents over 65 × index
Structure of local industries
Structure of local industries × index
Fiscal factors
Function in public health
Function in public health × index
Function in social service
Function in social service × index
Function in public school
Function in public school × index
Structure of general revenues
Structure of general revenues × index

(3)
Debt level

-0.184
(0.720)

(2)
Intergov.
revenue
dependence
33.06***
(10.99)

-0.364
(0.912)

(4)
General
budget
Surplus/deficit
-10.60
(16.79)

0.225***
(0.0107)
-0.0725***
(0.0123)
0.297***
(0.0408)
0.00250
(0.0488)
-0.114***
(0.0291)
0.0687**
(0.0320)
0.272***
(0.0292)
-0.148***
(0.0386)
-1.373***
(0.388)
1.216***
(0.401)

-0.235
(0.152)
-0.779***
(0.199)
0.336
(0.628)
-1.647**
(0.816)
2.068***
(0.408)
-1.278***
(0.476)
0.381
(0.374)
-0.443
(0.512)
-3.531
(5.379)
-12.09**
(5.685)

0.0738***
(0.0188)
0.0276
(0.0173)
-0.161***
(0.0615)
-0.0163
(0.0596)
-0.109**
(0.0496)
0.0373
(0.0442)
-0.242***
(0.0428)
-0.0430
(0.0598)
0.0952
(0.503)
0.567
(0.553)

-0.358
(0.254)
0.101
(0.281)
2.078*
(1.099)
0.821
(1.167)
0.761
(0.712)
0.726
(0.767)
-1.772**
(0.798)
0.166
(1.085)
0.370
(8.059)
-3.191
(9.527)

0.0171
(0.0313)
0.0750**
(0.0333)
-0.174***
(0.0303)
-0.142***
(0.0338)
0.0933***
(0.0311)
-0.0526
(0.0357)
0.873***
(0.106)
0.243*
(0.131)

3.012***
(0.456)
2.070***
(0.473)
-4.465***
(0.447)
2.263***
(0.486)
-0.224
(0.494)
-5.465***
(0.597)
14.23***
(1.532)
3.836**
(1.920)

-0.0270
(0.0415)
0.0216
(0.0395)
0.249***
(0.0412)
0.0202
(0.0447)
0.0210
(0.0485)
0.133***
(0.0507)
0.824***
(0.182)
0.0320
(0.171)

3.267***
(0.860)
-0.829
(0.879)
-0.716
(0.830)
0.840
(0.897)
-2.062**
(0.823)
0.509
(0.877)
-8.931***
(2.050)
0.784
(2.192)
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Table 2.6 (continued)
Structure of tax revenues
Structure of tax revenues × index
Institutional factors
BBR
BBR × index
Debt limit
Debt limit × index
TELs stringency index
TELs stringency index × index

2006 (2001 as reference)
2011 (2001 as reference)
Constant

-0.0810
(0.0494)
0.0299
(0.0546)

-7.143***
(0.733)
-0.218
(0.879)

-0.0417
(0.0775)
-0.243***
(0.0743)

1.734
(1.131)
0.430
(1.291)

-0.117***
(0.0285)
0.0351
(0.0305)
-0.132***
(0.0283)
-0.114***
(0.0336)
0.00603***
(0.00117)
-0.00400**
(0.00161)

-5.104***
(0.405)
-0.916**
(0.446)
-2.589***
(0.445)
2.453***
(0.557)
-0.164***
(0.0178)
0.0561**
(0.0260)

-0.132***
(0.0438)
0.0292
(0.0428)
-0.0906**
(0.0441)
-0.0869*
(0.0477)
-0.00218
(0.00186)
-0.00363
(0.00227)

-1.841***
(0.632)
-0.202
(0.716)
-0.303
(0.722)
1.563*
(0.812)
0.0332
(0.0285)
0.00555
(0.0373)

0.444***
(0.0266)
0.677***
(0.0281)
1.246**
(0.633)

-2.400***
(0.363)
-2.305***
(0.406)
16.49*
(9.084)

0.143***
(0.0472)
0.287***
(0.0559)
2.407***
(0.893)

1.174*
(0.669)
1.197*
(0.657)
-10.08
(15.23)

Observations
6,758
6,750
6,579
6,785
R-squared
0.214
0.154
0.030
0.016
Notes: Results are obtained by estimating model (3). Refer to table 2.4 for the
measurements and descriptive statistics of variables. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Results in table 2.6 show that the unemployment rate is negatively and statistically
significantly correlated with government fiscal conditions for the first two indicators. The
signs of the estimated coefficients of the interaction item between the unemployment rate
and the municipal structure political-administrative index show that as the municipal
structure becomes more administrative, the negative correlation between the
unemployment rate and government fiscal conditions is moderated. A potential explanation
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is that, as the nature of municipal structure becomes more administrative, increasing
managerial professionalism and efficiency as well as adoption of prospecting in strategy
stance help government officials effectively mitigate the negative effect of external
economic difficulties on government fiscal conditions.
Results in table 2.6 show that the more stringent fiscal constraints by TELs help
governments improve fiscal conditions for the first two indicators. Based on the
coefficients of the interaction item between the municipal structure index and TELs
stringency index, as the municipal structure becomes more administrative, the positive
correlation between the TELs stringency index and government fiscal conditions is
moderated. One potential explanation is that a higher level of professional autonomy helps
government officials adeptly circumvent the fiscal constraints by TELs.
3.6.4 Solving the Endogeneity Problem Using IVs
Structural characteristics may be endogenously adopted in municipalities, which
will lead to biased estimates of the effect of municipal structure. The endogeneity problem
may result from the unobservable or unmeasurable confounder in the error term in
estimation models or the reverse causality between municipal structure and governments’
fiscal conditions.
There may be unobservable or unmeasurable factors existing in the error term that
can simultaneously determine the municipal structure and affect government fiscal
conditions. These factors can presumably involve the political preferences of local citizens
and cultural and historical features of municipalities. It is also reasonable to assume that
municipalities may appoint a CAO or change other structural characteristics because of
poor fiscal performance.
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One means to cope with the endogeneity problem is to utilize instrumental variables
(IVs) for municipal structure. Appropriate instrumental variables must be strongly
correlated with municipal structure and independent of the error term in the fiscal condition
determinants model (Arellano and Bover 1995). Selection of instrumental variables is
based on existing evidence on the determinants of municipal structure. Nelson (2011) finds
that states’ statutory or constitutional provisions on municipal governments’ autonomy of
institutional changes influence local choices of municipal form or structural characteristics.
Similarly, Marando and Reeves (1993) find that states’ constitutional or legislative
decisions to allow for structural changes in local governments substantially affect the
structural reforms of county governments.
This article uses existence of the initiative and popular referendum that allow
citizens to place changes of the charter, ordinance, and home rule on the ballot as IVs for
municipal structure. Data on the initiative and popular referendum in municipalities are
derived from the Municipal Form of Government surveys by ICMA. As a matter of fact,
according to the survey results, many structural changes are made through local charters,
resolutions, or ordinances. There is no sufficient or convincing evidence demonstrating
that citizens’ autonomy to change the charter and ordinance through initiative and popular
referendum has independent effects on indicators of government fiscal conditions.
The results of using IVs for the municipal structure political-administrative index
and utilizing the Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) to regress model (1) are reported in table
2.7. The two IVs perform remarkably well from the statistical perspective. The CraggDonald Wald F-statistic from the weak identification test shows that the “weak instruments”
hypothesis is statistically significantly rejected in all the four regressions. The Hansen J-
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statistic from the over-identification restriction test suggests that the hypothesis of no
correlation between the IVs and the error term in the model of interest cannot be
statistically significantly rejected.
The coefficients of the municipal structure index are statistically significant in the
first three columns, and the signs of coefficients indicate that the administrative municipal
structure has a positive effect on government fiscal conditions for the first three indicators.
Compared to the results shown in columns (1) and (2) in table 2.5, signs of the coefficients
of the municipal structure index remain unchanged, but the magnitudes of effects are much
larger. The effect of municipal structure on debt level reported in column (3) in table 2.5
is not statistically significant, but it becomes statistically significant in column (3) in table
2.7 when using IVs to solve the endogeneity problem. The results imply that the positive
effect of the administrative municipal structure on government fiscal conditions is
underestimated in the original estimation due to the endogeneity problem.
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Table 2.7 Effect of municipal structure using IVs

VARIABLES

Municipal structure index
Socioeconomic factors
Population size (log)
Mean household income
Unemployment rate
Fraction of residents over 65
Structure of local industries
Fiscal factors
Function in public health
Function in social service
Function in public school
Structure of general revenues
Structure of tax revenues
Institutional factors
BBR
Debt limit
TELs stringency index

2006 (2001 as reference)
2011 (2001 as reference)
Constant
Weak identification test
(Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic)

(1)
Cash
solvency

(3)
Debt level

0.491***
(0.139)

(2)
Intergov.
revenue
dependence
-6.931***
(2.043)

-0.494**
(0.247)

(4)
General
budget
Surplus/deficit
1.706
(3.017)

0.238***
(0.0130)
0.106*
(0.0635)
-0.152***
(0.0329)
0.256***
(0.0327)
-1.335***
(0.469)

-0.143
(0.181)
1.916*
(1.020)
2.505***
(0.491)
-0.0535
(0.428)
1.175
(5.969)

0.0419*
(0.0254)
-0.0388
(0.0966)
-0.115**
(0.0574)
-0.291***
(0.0485)
0.307
(0.581)

-0.568**
(0.276)
1.940
(1.403)
0.649
(0.756)
-1.880**
(0.846)
2.494
(8.553)

0.197***
(0.0628)
-0.211***
(0.0341)
0.0510
(0.0352)
0.739***
(0.122)
-0.306***
(0.0784)

-0.261
(0.886)
-4.969***
(0.488)
2.598***
(0.577)
14.28***
(1.762)
-4.993***
(1.074)

-0.215**
(0.104)
0.227***
(0.0456)
0.118*
(0.0608)
0.905***
(0.201)
0.255*
(0.147)

3.783***
(1.400)
-0.334
(0.838)
-2.363***
(0.834)
-8.294***
(2.096)
0.861
(1.594)

-0.354***
(0.0792)
-0.220***
(0.0336)
-0.00241
(0.00271)

-1.082
(1.153)
-1.089**
(0.485)
-0.0358
(0.0397)

0.152
(0.127)
-0.0655
(0.0517)
0.00655
(0.00490)

-2.966*
(1.647)
-0.456
(0.797)
-0.0117
(0.0585)

-0.640***
(0.0320)
-0.222***
(0.0302)
4.568***
(0.959)

2.180***
(0.471)
-0.0997
(0.429)
-15.45
(14.33)

-0.308***
(0.0622)
-0.160***
(0.0475)
1.030
(1.361)

-0.815
(0.714)
0.441
(0.707)
-5.554
(19.38)

39.1

40.1

39.3

40.3
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Table 2.7 (continued)
Over-identification test
(Hansen J-statistic)

2.67
(p=0.102)

1.69
(p=0.193)

0.210
(p=0.647)

0.265
(p=0.607)

Observations
5,853
5,844
5,690
5,875
Notes: Results are obtained by estimating model (1), using existence of the initiative
and popular referendum that allow citizens to place changes of the charter, ordinance, and
home rule on the ballot as IVs for the municipal structure political-administrative index.
Refer to table 2.4 for the measurements and descriptive statistics of variables. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
3.7

Conclusions
Evidence from this article has implications for the effect of municipal structure and

the determinants of local government fiscal conditions. Previous empirical studies usually
adopt a dichotomous classification of municipal form as the mayor-council or councilmanager. However, prevalent cross-adoption of structural characteristics makes the
boundary between the nominal forms ambiguous. Absorbing the merits of typologies used
by previous studies to reclassify municipal structure, this article constructs a municipal
structure political-administrative index by investigating structural characteristics
pertaining to managerial professionalism, separation of powers, and local electoral systems.
The index measures the political or administrative nature of municipal structure. The
former underscores separation of powers and checks and balances between the mayor and
council members, direct responsiveness and accountability of the mayor to voters, and
influence of parties and special interests on local elections; and the latter highlights
managerial professionalism, concentration of powers in the council, and elimination of
partisan and special interests’ influence on elections.
Municipal structure is correlated with government internal management through a
variety of mechanisms. The administrative municipal structure promotes managerial
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professionalism and efficiency and stimulates officials to act as prospectors in the choice
of managerial strategy stance. These effects lead to a positive correlation between the
municipal structure political-administrative index and government fiscal performance. On
the other hand, considering the public nature of governments, officials’ accountability to
the public and prompt reacting to the dynamic demands of voters are also important for
improving government performance. This study accordingly hypothesizes that the
municipal structure that mixes the political and administrative characteristics may result in
better fiscal conditions, which implies an inverted U-shaped relationship between the
municipal structure index and indicators of government fiscal conditions. In addition,
municipal structure can moderate effects of the factors of external environments on
government fiscal performance. The empirical evidence supports the proposed hypotheses
for the fiscal conditions of governments in cash solvency, dependence on
intergovernmental transfers, and debt level. The evidence becomes stronger when using
instrumental variables to solve the endogeneity problem of municipal structure.
This research practices the approaches suggested by Carr (2015) to advance research
on the effect of municipal structure on government performance. A potential limitation is
that the correlations between municipal structure and officials’ strategy stance choices and
managerial accountability and efficiency is based on theoretical inference. Therefore,
further studies that produce empirical evidence to support the correlations are encouraged.
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CHAPTER 4. THE DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL SLACK: EVIDENCE
FROM A POLITICAL-BUDGETARY-MANAGERIAL FRAMEWORK
4.1

Introduction
Classic public finance theories hold that counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies

are exclusive domains of the national government (Musgrave 1959). Contrary to this
conventional wisdom, the seminal work of Gramlich (1987) contends that subnational
governments play an important counter-cyclical role in stabilizing the budget (Hou and
Moynihan 2007; Wang and Hou 2012). State governments can save fiscal slack, which is
commonly called a “rainy” day fund or budget stabilization fund, in economic booms to
have resources to spend during downturn periods, thus influencing governmental savings
and budgetary stabilization (Hou 2006; Hou and Brewer 2010; Knight and Levinson 1999;
Rose 2008; Wagner 2003; Wei and Denison 2019).
The rationale of fiscal slack and budgetary stabilization is also applicable to the local
government (Tyer 1993; Wolkoff 1987). Compared to the state, local government has a
lower degree of fiscal autonomy amid fiscal constraints by the state and is more dependent
on intergovernmental transfers. Moreover, the external fiscal environments of local
government changed dramatically in recent decades (Chapman 2008), rendering them
more reliant on the pro-cyclical and income-elastic local sales taxes and program charges
and fees. The increasing fiscal vulnerability and volatility makes budgetary stabilization a
salient challenge of local government fiscal management.
Research on local government fiscal slack has substantial implications for
practitioners and academics in the field of public administration and management.
Accumulation and usage of fiscal slack is relevant to the effective and efficient
management of government fiscal resources, which are the basis on which public services
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are provided, government functions are realized, and government performance is measured
and evaluated (Jimenez 2017). Also, management of local government fiscal slack pertains
to budgetary transparency on the grounds that local government usually uses an informal
form of fiscal slack, such as the year-end general fund balances, which are less regulated
by legislation and institutional rules compared to the state budget stabilization funds (Rose
and Smith 2012; Stewart et al.2015). Moreover, local government usually maintains
massive general fund balances as fiscal slack, which is vastly beyond the 5-15 percent of
operating budget recommended by credit rating agencies and professional organizations
(Gore 2009; Marlowe 2005). Research on local government fiscal slack sheds light on the
motivations and consequences of government’s saving behavior.
This research specifically focuses on the determinants of local government fiscal
slack balance. Scholars have recently advanced studies in this research area (Gianakis and
Snow 2007; Gore 2009; Guo and Wang 2017; Hendrick 2006; Snow, Gianakis, and
Haughton 2015; Wang and Hou 2012); however, the existing evidence is mixed or
inconclusive. This article contributes evidence for the related literature through examining
the determinants of local government’s fiscal slack in a three-dimensional framework
comprised by voters’ political preferences, government’s budgetary performance, and
government internal management. The essential argument is that factors of each dimension
work interactively to affect government fiscal slack, instead of exerting influence
independently.
The next section of this article introduces the related literature and discusses the
limitations. Section three constructs the theoretical framework of government fiscal slack
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and proposes three testable hypotheses. Section four introduces the research methodology,
followed by the empirical results in Section five. The last section concludes and discusses.

4.2

Related Literature
4.2.1 Determinants of Local Government Fiscal Slack
Prior research on the determinants of local government fiscal slack involves

perspectives from multiple disciplines. Organizational slack is first studied by
organizational scientists in such classic works as Cyert and March (1963) and Thompson
(1967). These scholars hold that organizational slack can serve as the inducement to
maintain a coalition of interest groups inside the organization, resources for conflict
resolution, buffer of workflow, and facilitators of strategic behavior of organization
managers (Bourgeois 1981). Therefore, the organizations that face fierce internal conflicts,
that are exposed to external uncertainties, and whose “core technology” is vulnerable to
external competition should maintain a high level of slack resources (Bourgeois 1981;
Nohria and Gulati 1997; Sharfman et al. 1988). In the field of government fiscal
management, scholars have found that local governments whose revenues are more volatile
or uncertain are prone to save more fiscal slack (Gore 2009; Guo and Wang 2017); however,
there is insufficient evidence on the effects of other organizational factors.
From the perspective of political responsiveness or accountability, voters can
substantially influence local government’s fiscal policy making by expressing their
preferences on the ballot. Although preferences of various groups regarding governmental
saving and spending policies may bifurcate, adhering to the preference of the median voter
is the optimal political strategy by politicians who want to be re-elected (Downs 1957).
The Tiebout (1956) theorem also implies that mobile residents can choose their living
78

communities based on their preferences for tax and expenditure policies, resulting in
relatively unified preferences or sentiment of voters in a community. Snow, Gianakis, and
Haughton (2015) find that voters’ anti-tax and pro-spending sentiment has a negative effect
on the balance of Massachusetts municipalities’ stabilization funds.
Managerial factors inside the government can also enormously affect government
fiscal slack. Hendrick (2006) argues that the managerial capacity and professional
management of local government may be more important than other political and
socioeconomic factors in determining government’s fiscal behavior. Hendrick (2006) finds
that professional management in Chicago’s suburban municipalities helps increase their
unreserved general fund balances. Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton (2015) point out that
sophisticated expertise, professional training, managerial experiences, and commitment to
professionalism are necessary components of professional financial management. They
find a positive correlation between government’s financial management capacity and the
balance of Massachusetts municipalities’ stabilization funds.
Demographic, economic, and financial factors can affect local government fiscal
slack from the supply and demand side. Groups with different demographic characteristics
have various demands for public goods and services in both quantity and quality, thus
influencing government expenditures and savings (Marlowe 2011). Outstanding economic
performance and healthy financial conditions create the ultimate revenue base for
government to save (Guo and Wang 2017; Stewart 2009; Wang and Hou 2012). All prior
studies on local government fiscal slack control in research models for demographic,
economic, and financial factors, such as government revenues and expenditures (Wang and
Hou 2012), outstanding debt and debt service (Gore 2009), population size and growth
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(Gore 2009; Guo and Wang 2017), and the unemployment rate (Stewart 2009), among
others.
4.2.2 Limitations in Previous Studies
An important limitation of previous studies is the lack of integration of various
theoretical perspectives into a comprehensive framework and the consequent failure to
probe into the interactive effects of multiple factors on government fiscal slack in empirical
investigations. Government fiscal management outputs are the products of an interactive
process between the external environments and internal government management.
However, most previous studies do not take into account the interaction effects, and they
implicitly assume that all factors exert their influence on government fiscal slack balance
independently.
Inferences based on various theoretical perspectives may result in contradictory
conclusions. For instance, organizational theories suggest that government mired in
declining economic and fiscal conditions are confronted with an unstable external
environment and, therefore, should maintain more fiscal slack for coping with potential
crises. Nevertheless, from the perspectives of economics and fiscal management,
deteriorating economic and fiscal conditions damage the revenue base and render
government incapable of saving much fiscal slack. As another example, scholars and
practitioners may predict that government amid voters’ anti-tax and pro-spending
sentiment will exhaust most surpluses, even with outstanding economic performance and
healthy fiscal conditions. However, professioanl management inside government may
counteract the influence of voters’ sentiment on government fiscal policy making.
Therefore, failure to analyze government fiscal slack in a comprehensive multiple-
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dimensional framework may result in an unclear or misleading conclusion with regard to
what factors motivating government to save.
Another limitation of previous studies is the scarce attention paid to the essential
role government internal management plays in determining government fiscal slack
balance, as well as the effect of its interaction with the external socioeconomic and political
environments. Inputs from the external environment are processed by internal
management of policy makers to produce policy outputs. Government internal
management can hardly exert direct control over the external environment, but it can
influence the external environment to a large extent through strategic policy choices. For
instance, government officials can utilize tax credits to attract private investment, thus
enhancing local economic vigor. Government internal management can also affect local
government fiscal behavior by adjusting managerial practices. For instance, the elected
political leader can promote government fiscal management in a professional manner by
appointing an experienced fiscal manager who is responsible for budgetary and fiscal
affairs and by adopting advanced fiscal management techniques and procedures.

4.3

A Theoretical Framework of Government Fiscal Slack
This article constructs a three-dimensional framework to analyze the determinants of

local government fiscal slack balance by addressing (1) the political preferences or
sentiment of voters, (2) the budgetary performance of government, and (3) government
internal management. This research proposes one appropriate indicator for each of the
dimensions, and the hypotheses are introduced accordingly.
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4.3.1 Voters’ Political Preferences
In the classic principal-agent model, government officials as the agent must defer
to the demands and preferences of voters who act as the principal in public policy making
(Waterman and Meier 1998). The officials who defy the preferences or sentiment of voters
will be voted out in elections. Budgetary savings may trigger political pressure among the
anti-tax groups who view the unspent fiscal slack as unnecessary tax levies and the prospending groups who view fiscal slack as forgone spending (Rose and Smith 2012; Snow,
Gianakis, and Haughton 2015). Therefore, government in the midst of voters’ anti-tax or
pro-spending sentiment is less likely to accumulate much fiscal slack. In contrast, in
communities where voters are risk-averse and fiscally prudent, government is motivated to
save more.
It is always a challenge to operationalize the elusive preference or sentiment of
voters in empirical studies, especially as the available tool of measurement is limited to
secondary administrative data. This research employs and adjusts the method of Snow,
Gianakis, and Haughton (2015) to measure the anti-tax and pro-spending sentiment of
voters. Anti-tax sentiment makes government hesitate to levy an excessive level of tax,
which is manifested in the tax revolt since California’s Proposition 13 in 1978. Snow,
Gianakis, and Haughton (2015) argue that voters’ political sentiment remains stable for a
fairly long time. Therefore, they measure voters’ anti-tax sentiment in Massachusetts
municipalities by averaging the percentage of voters who are in favor to “limit the growth
of taxes, reduce tax rates, change tax structures, or repeal them outright” in “eight statewide
tax measures appeared on general election ballots in Massachusetts” between 1980 and
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2010 (Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton 2015: 306).15 The authors assume that voters’ antitax sentiment does not change over decades and use the anti-tax sentiment as a timeinvariant variable in empirical research. Appendix 1 presents the eight statewide tax
limitation ballot questions and the vote results. All the five proposed tax limitations before
2000 were successfully enacted, but the three after 2000 failed.
Figure 3.1 displays the box plot of the percentages of voters in Massachusetts
municipalities who are in favor of tax limitations for each of the eight ballot questions.
Although the tax limitation measures are different, the fundamental assumption here is that
the vote results can reflect voters’ attitudes or sentiment towards taxation at a certain time
in a similar way. Figure 3.1 shows that voters’ anti-tax sentiment is dynamic across time.
It presents a trend of increasing in most time of the 1980s and 1990s and decreasing in the
2000s, and it displays a hint of increasing after 2008. Therefore, this research does not treat
voters’ anti-tax sentiment as time-invariant. This research uses the percentage of voters in
each municipality who are in favor of tax limitation on each of the eight ballots as the
indicator of anti-tax sentiment for the municipality in the ballot year. The missing values
in the interval (non-ballot) years are interpolated by averaging the percentages for the most
recent ballot question before and after the interval year weighted by the time distance. 16

15

Refer to Wallin (2004) for more details pertaining to the tax limitation measures on general election ballots
in Massachusetts.
16

For instance, the missing value in 2003 is interpolated by averaging the values in 2002 and 2008, weighting
the value in 2002 by 5/6 and the value in 2008 by 1/6. The missing value in 2004 is interpolated by averaging
the values in 2002 and 2008, weighting the value in 2002 by 4/6 and the value in 2008 by 2/6. The last tax
limitation measure was proposed in 2010 in the dataset. This research interpolates the anti-tax sentiment in
2011 by directly substituting into the value in 2010.
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Figure 3.1 Box plot of the percentages of voters in Massachusetts municipalities favoring
tax limitations in eight statewide ballot questions for 1980-2010

The pro-spending sentiment is measured by the action of voters’ override of the
state-imposed property tax limit (Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton 2015). The research
sample is municipalities in Massachusetts. In 1980, Massachusetts’ voters in a statewide
referendum initiated and passed Proposition 2½ to limit the levy amount and growth rate
of property tax in all municipalities. Meanwhile, the state constitution empowers municipal
governments to override the property tax limit and increase the quota of property tax levy
amount if government officials propose an override on the ballot and local voters approve
it in a referendum. If a property tax limit override is successfully passed in a municipality,
the government is able to increase property tax levy and spend more. Snow, Gianakis, and
Haughton (2015) use a binary variable to indicate the successful property tax limit override
as the measure of voters’ pro-spending sentiment. However, Massachusetts municipalities
may propose multiple property tax limit overrides on multiple ballots in one single year or
propose multiple overrides on one ballot (this is called the “measure” approach). Therefore,
one successful override among multiple attempts may reflect a different degree of voters’
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pro-spending sentiment compared to one success out of one single attempt. This research
adjusts the method of Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton (2015) by using the percentage of the
successful property tax limit override amounts among the proposed override amounts as a
continuous measure of voters’ pro-spending sentiment in a certain year. If no override
attempts occur in a given municipality-year observation, a value 0 is assigned.
Hypothesis 1: Voters’ anti-tax and pro-spending preferences are
negatively correlated with the balance of government fiscal slack, all else
being equal.
4.3.2 Budgetary Performance
The second important dimension in the framework of government fiscal slack
analysis is government’s budgetary performance, which is defined as a concept that can
comprehensively reflect the situation of budgetary operation of government in the longterm. This article uses the method of Hou (2003) and Wei and Denison (2019) to calculate
the budgetary gap, that is, the difference between the actual operating budget and the
expected trend of operating budget in the long-term, as a measure of government’s
budgetary performance. The budgetary gap can be positive or negative. A positive
budgetary gap means that the operating budget in a certain year stands above the long-term
expected trend, and the contrary for the negative budgetary gap. Specially, the budgetary
gap is expressed as follows.
𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦_𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵𝑖𝑡 − 𝐵𝑖𝑡∗

(1).

𝐵𝑖𝑡 indicates the actual per capita operating budget in municipality 𝑖 in year t, and
𝐵𝑖𝑡∗ refers to the expected trend value. 𝐵𝑖𝑡∗ is obtained “using a time trend ordinary least
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squares (OLS) regression model” (Wei and Denison 2019: 11), which can be expressed as
follows.
𝐵𝑖𝑡∗ = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑇𝑡

(2).

𝛼𝑖 is the constant for municipality 𝑖, 𝛽𝑖 is the estimated parameter for the given
municipality, and 𝑇𝑡 is the coded time value. Based on the available data in the analysis,
this research calculates the expected trend of per capita operating budget for 25 years
(1991-2015).
Accurate forecasting of government revenues, expenditures and operating budget
is a substantial challenge confronted by both practitioners and scholars of government
financial management (Mikesell 2018). Numerous technical and structural difficulties
hinder government financial managers from minimizing the volatility of government
revenues and expenditures and maintaining a long-term smooth operating budget.
Whatever the reasons are, intuitively, a positive budgetary gap, which happens when the
actual per capita operating budget exceeds the expected trend, presumably manifests
affluent revenues and sound fiscal conditions. Therefore, government with a positive
(negative) budgetary gap is more likely to save more (less) fiscal slack. In another line of
reasoning, fiscal slack is usually saved in economically and fiscally sound times to spend
during downturn periods (Hou and Brewer 2010; Hou and Moynihan 2007). Although a
positive budgetary gap does noes necessarily result in budgetary surpluses, government
with an operating budget exceeding the expected trend level is more likely to save fiscal
slack.
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Hypothesis 2: Government’s budgetary performance, which is
measured by the budgetary gap, is positively correlated with the balance of
government fiscal slack, all else being equal.
4.3.3 Government Internal Management
Scholars of public management generally hold that management matters for
government performance (Boyne 2003; Meier and O'Toole 2002; Moynihan and Pandey
2004; Nicholson-Crotty and O'Toole 2004; O'Toole and Meier 1999, 2003). However,
comprehensively and accurately operationalizing the managerial factors inside government
in empirical studies on the management-performance linkage is a challenge for scholars
(Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003). Government management is an abstract concept
which can be examined from the perspectives of managerial structure and managerial
practice (Justice and Scorsone 2013). The former primarily focuses on the structural and
institutional settings based on which government officials enact and implement public
policies and operate the government (Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2004; Wei, Butler,
and Jennings 2019), while the latter specifically examines the practical or technical aspects
of government internal management, such as who takes charge of a certain government
function, how public policies are enacted and what the procedures are in implementing the
policies.
Prior studies usually employ indicators that can partly reflect the quality or practice
of government internal management (Meier and O'Toole 2002; O'Toole and Meier 2003).
However, as noted by Nicholson-Crotty and O'Toole (2004), it is infeasible to measure all
forms of managerial efforts in public organizations. To operationalize government internal
management in a feasible manner and considering data availability in measurement, this
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article focuses on the government structure of municipalities in Massachusetts as an
appropriate indicator of government internal management by classifying the municipal
structure on a political-administrative dimension using the method of Wei, Butler, and
Jennings (2019). Under different municipal structures, the political officials and
professional bureaucrats are elected or appointed in different methods and they have
various responsibilities, motivations, and behavior in government internal management
(Demir and Reddick 2012), resulting in different combinations of management efficiency
and accountability (Wei, Butler, and Jennings 2019; Zhang 2014; Zhang and Feiock 2009).
Similarly, the political market framework of Lubell et al. (2009) argues that the institutional
structure “determines the balance of administrative and electoral power in any given city.”
(Lubell et al. 2009: 653).
The conventional wisdom that separates the primary municipal structure into the
mayor-council or council-manager is problematic because the prevalent cross-adoption of
structural characteristics between different municipal structures makes the structure
boundaries ambiguous (Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2004; Lubell et al. 2009; Wei,
Butler, and Jennings 2019).17 Scholars have proposed various approaches to reclassify the
municipal structure (Carr and Karuppusamy 2008, 2009; Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood
2004; Wei, Butler, and Jennings 2019).18 This study applies the method of Wei, Butler, and
Jennings (2019) by focusing on six fundamental structural characteristics, coding the

17

There are five statutory forms of municipal structure in the U.S. municipalities: mayor-council, councilmanager, commission, town meeting, and representative town meeting. The basic characteristics of these
forms can be found on the website of the National League of Cities at http://www.nlc.org/forms-ofmunicipal-government.
18

Wei, Butler, and Jennings (2019) in their study introduce the prior efforts to reclassify municipal structure
in detail and discuss the merits and limitations of various approaches of reclassification. Also, the authors
propose the method of classifying municipal structure on a political-administrative dimension.
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structural characteristics based on their political or administrative nature, and using factor
analysis to construct a municipal structure political-administrative index. The “approach
of constructing an index to reclassify municipal structures on a political-administrative
dimension has the merit of comprehensively evaluating the political or administrative
nature of municipal structures by investigating more structural characteristics.” (Wei,
Butler, and Jennings 2019: 192).
The standards for constructing the municipal structure index are presented in table
3.1. For each of the six structural characteristics, a value 0, 0.5, or 1 is assigned based on
their political or professional nature. 19 This research constructs the municipal structure
political-professional index by predicting the principal factor after factor analysis of the six
coded values. The factor analysis reports only one eigenvalue above one, which is 3.11,
and the second largest eigenvalue is 0.11. Appendix 2 reports the factor loadings of
components for the obtained principal factor, which is positively and heavily loaded by the
first five structural characteristics. The principal factor is used as the municipal structure
index, and it ranges between -2 and 0.57 in the research sample, with mean 0.04 and
standard deviation 0.94. A lower index indicates a more political municipal structure and
a higher index indicates a more administrative or professional municipal structure.

19

Wei, Butler, and Jennings (2019) have discussed the political or administrative nature of each structural
characteristic in detail. Readers who are interested in the method of municipal structure classification can
refer to their study.
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Table 3.1 Standards for constructing the municipal structure political-professional index
Standards\Coded values
0
0.5
1
Does a chief administrative officer (CAO) exist?
No
Yes
How is the government head elected?
Direct election
Non-direct election
Is the government head independent of council (board)?
Yes
No
Does the government head have authority to veto council (board)?
Yes
No
Is the election of council (board) members partisan or nonpartisan? Partisan
Nonpartisan
Is the election of council (board) members at-large or by-district?
By-district
Combination
At-large
Notes: The method of constructing the municipal structure political-administrative index is borrowed from Wei, Butler, and
Jennings (2019). Refer to table 1 of their research for comparison. Note that this article deletes one structural characteristic here (the
statutory form as mayor-council or council-manager) on the grounds many Massachusetts municipalities among the research sample use
the town meeting or representative town meeting form but Wei, Butler, and Jennings (2019) only involve the mayor-council and councilmanager municipalities in their study.
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Wei, Butler, and Jennings (2019) have discussed the validity and reliability of the
municipal structure political-professional index in detail. This research here only briefly
introduces some results from the related statistical tests. The Pearson correlation
coefficients show that almost each pair of the six index components (namely, the coded
values of the structural characteristics) is statistically significantly correlated at the 0.001
level. This research then uses the Cronbach’s alpha to test the internal scale reliability and
consistency of the index components. The alpha value 0.82 indicates that the six index
components are closely related to be measurements of a single concept. Further, the fact
that only one eigenvalue value after the factor analysis is above the threshold value one
demonstrates the unidimensional nature of the six index components.
The primary purpose of this research is to investigate how government internal
management can interact with the factors of voters’ preferences and government’s
budgetary performance to influence government fiscal slack balance. Government internal
management under the more political structure underscores officials’ political leadership
and direct responsiveness and accountability to voters, as well as the influence of partisan
politics on policy making. In contrast, government internal management under the more
administrative or professional structure stresses the effective and efficient management by
professional managers who possess managerial experience and expertise and the
elimination of partisan influence on local affairs. Therefore, government officials under the
municipal structure with more administrative or professional nature can more easily
moderate the influence of voters’ preferences and the pressure from economic and
budgetary performance in fiscal policy making by taking advantages of professional
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expertise and skills. This research accordingly proposes the third testable hypothesis as
follows.
Hypothesis 3: Government internal management, which is
operationalized by the municipal structure political-administrative index,
modifies the negative effect of voters’ anti-tax and pro-spending
preferences and the positive effect of the budgetary gap on the balance of
government fiscal slack, all else being equal.

4.4

Methodology
This study uses Massachusetts municipalities as the sample for empirical analysis.

Although focusing on municipalities from one state has a limitation in external
generalizability, it mitigates the problem of inconsistence in the measurement of local
government’s fiscal slack across states. It also has the advantage of having a consistent set
of state rules that apply to the municipalities. Almost all Massachusetts municipalities have
adopted stabilization funds as the main form of fiscal slack (Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton
2015). Moreover, the rich data resources provided by the Division of Local Services (DLS)
of Massachusetts Department of Revenue facilitate the empirical investigation.
4.4.1 Model Specification
This research first uses the OLS regression model with fixed effects to examine the
direct effects of the variables of interest depicted in the previous section on government
fiscal slack. Although the primary purpose of this study is to investigate the determinants
of government fiscal slack in an interactive framework, this effort corresponds to the
endeavors of previous studies and serves as the basis of comparison to the results from the
multiplicative interaction regression model. The first model is specified as follows.
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𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3 𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(3).

This research then employs the multiplicative interaction regression model with
fixed effects to test the modifying effect of government internal management on the effects
of voters’ preferences and government’s budgetary performance on government fiscal
slack. All constitutive terms of the interaction items should be included in the
multiplicative interaction model (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2005).20 The second model
is specified as follows.
𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑀𝑖𝑡 × 𝐵𝑖𝑡 +
+𝛽6 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + µ𝑖𝑡

(4)

𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the fiscal slack balance of municipality i in year t. This study uses the per
capita stabilization fund balance as the measure of the amount of government fiscal slack
in Massachusetts municipalities. 𝑃𝑖𝑡 refers to voters’ preferences, measured by the anti-tax
and pro-spending sentiment. 𝐵𝑖𝑡 indicates the budgetary performance of government,
which is measured by the budgetary gap. Lastly, 𝑀𝑖𝑡 denotes municipal government’s
internal management, indicated by the municipal structure political-administrative index.
𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents a vector of control variables, which will be described below. Municipality
fixed effects are 𝜃𝑖 (in equation 3) and 𝛿𝑖 (in equation 4) that control for the effects of the
time-invariant, unobserved characteristics of municipalities. Time fixed effects are 𝜆𝑡 (in
equation 3) and 𝛾𝑡 (in equation 4), which control for the environmental variations along
with time that are common to all municipalities. The estimated parameters are 𝛼 and 𝛽,
and 𝜀 and µ are the disturbance terms.

20

Refer to Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2005) for details about the multiplicative interaction regression
model and the interpretation of regression results.
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4.4.2 Data Collection
The units of analysis are municipality-year observations in Massachusetts. Data are
derived from two sources. Data on fiscal slack (stabilization funds), operating budget,
demographic characteristics and fiscal indicators are collected from the DLS of
Massachusetts Department of Revenue. 21 This research collects the data on the structural
characteristics of Massachusetts municipalities from the Municipal Form of Government
surveys implemented by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA)
in 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011.22 The ICMA mails survey questions to clerks of all
municipalities with population size above 2,500 and to selected ones with population size
below 2,500. The five surveys used in this study have response rates around 50%. These
surveys are by far the most comprehensive resources about municipalities’ structural
characteristics, and they have been widely used in previous studies (Carr and Karuppusamy
2008, 2009; Coate and Knight 2011; Lubell et al. 2009).
This research focuses on municipalities in Massachusetts; therefore, only the
respondents from Massachusetts are involved in analysis. The surveys are implemented
every five years, with missing data in the interval years. Each survey includes questions
about structural characteristics in various aspects (e.g., Does your municipality have the
position of chief administrative officer? How is your government head elected?). Also,
there is a question that asks whether there have been any attempts to change the structural
characteristics since the previous survey. If the answer is “yes”, the respondent is asked to

21

The data are accessible at https://www.mass.gov/municipal-databank-data-analytics.

22

The ICMA implements the Municipal Form of Government survey every five years. The survey in 2011
is the most recent one that is available on the ICMA’s official website when this study is conducted.
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pinpoint which structural changes have been made and whether and when the changes have
been approved.
Some fundamental assumptions are made to interpolate the missing survey data in
the interval (non-survey) years. If the survey results show that a municipality has the same
structural characteristics in two consecutive surveys and the respondent answers “no” to
the question in the latter survey that asks whether the municipality has adjusted structural
characteristics since the previous survey, this study assumes that the municipality’s
structural characteristics remain consistent in the interval years between the two
consecutive surveys. The missing data of the interval years are filled in accordingly. If the
survey results show that a municipality has different structural characteristics in two
consecutive surveys and the respondent answers “yes” to the question in the latter survey
that asks whether the municipality has adjusted structural characteristics since the previous
survey, this study fills in the missing data in the interval years by referring to the answer
to the question that asks when the adjustments are approved and effective. If a municipality
does not reply to two surveys consecutively, the missing data in the interval years cannot
be interpolated. After merging datasets from the DLS and ICMA’s surveys and deleting
the observations with missing data, this study obtains an unbalanced panel of 1,306
municipality-year observations for 1993-2011.
4.4.3 Control Variables
Table 3.2 reports the names, measures, and descriptive statistics of all variables.
The three explanatory variables of interest have been introduced in the previous section.
This article next briefly discusses effects of the control variables (𝑋𝑖𝑡 in the regression
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models). Selection of the control variables is based on findings from previous studies and
data availability.
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Table 3.2 Variable names, measures, and descriptive statistics
Variable
Dependent variable
Fiscal slack size
Explanatory variables of interest
Municipal structure index
Pro-spending sentiment
Anti-tax sentiment
Budgetary performance
Control variables
Population size
Population growth rate
Unemployment rate
Total assessed value of properties
State aid
Revenue diversity
Excess tax capacity
Free cash
Overlay reserve
Debt level
Government creditworthiness

Measure

Mean

S. D.

Min

Max

Log of per capita stabilization fund balances

93.95

93.91

0.00

596.17

Refer to the introduction in manuscript
Refer to the introduction in manuscript
Refer to the introduction in manuscript
Per capita budgetary gap

0.04
7.76
55.55
-7.51

0.94
26.07
18.22
464.55

-2.00
0
12.91
-4154.92

0.57
100
90.56
3519.59

23041.66
0.59
4.62
132288.70
18.32
0.74
40.71
128.10
28.31
58.36
3.37

21524.24
2.38
2.25
84530.13
12.35
0.12
87.56
125.73
15.30
36.15
0.72

1496
166761
-49.18
21.39
0.90
27.50
36218.80 860985.60
0.82
60.57
0.34
0.96
0
966.49
-137.71
943.78
5.93
128.58
0
232.70
1
5

%
%
per capita
State aid as percentage of total revenues (%)
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index
Per capita
Per capita
Per capita
Outstanding debt as percentage of budget (%)
Credit ratings from Moody’s
(5=Aaa, 4=Aa, 3=A, 2=Baa, and 1=Ba)
Notes: The number of municipality-year observations in the main analysis is 1,306. All the fiscal values have been adjusted to
the 2011 real dollars.
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Population size and growth rate. Community population size and growth rate can
determine the amount of public services demanded by residents and the economies of scale
in public service provisions. A large and increasing community population creates pressure
on government’s expenditures. However, the government may save cost per unit when
providing public services to a larger size population. Therefore, the effects of population
size and growth rate on government fiscal slack are indeterminate.
Unemployment rate. This study uses the unemployment rate as an indicator of local
economic conditions. Governments with a higher unemployment rate should save more
fiscal slack to cope with potential economic and fiscal crises. However, the government
may be fiscally incapable of saving much because it is difficult to collect sufficient
revenues when economic conditions are deteriorating and the unemployment rate is high.
Therefore, the relation of unemployment rate to government fiscal slack is ambiguous.
Assessed value of properties. The assessed value of properties reflects the amount
of accumulated wealth in a community and serves as the base of local property tax revenues.
In communities with a higher value of properties, the capacity of government in coping
with potential fiscal crises is stronger. Therefore, the government can save less fiscal slack
and invest fiscal resources for economic development. There is a predicted negative
correlation between the assessed value of properties with the fiscal slack.
State aid. Municipalities that rely heavily on intergovernmental transfers are more
vulnerable to external fiscal environment fluctuations, such as state aid reductions.
Governments with a higher share of revenues from the state should save more to prepare
for potential reductions. On the other hand, undue reliance on state aid may be a
manifestation of weak fiscal capacity of local communities that do not have fiscal resources
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to save. Therefore, the correlation between the dependence on state aid and government
fiscal slack may be either positive or negative.
Revenue diversity. Local government’s revenue structure (concentrated or
diversified) can substantially affect its revenue volatility (Yan 2011). Governments with
diversified revenue sources are less vulnerable to fluctuations of external fiscal
environments. Therefore, it is less necessary to save fiscal slack to prepare for fiscal
uncertainties. However, diversified revenue sources may result in continuous accumulation
of fiscal surplus and lead to government amassing a large size of fiscal slack. 23
Free cash, excess tax capacity, and overlay reserve. Massachusetts municipalities
maintain some alternative tools of fiscal reserves or informal forms of fiscal slack in
budgetary operations. The free cash is the unrestricted funds from the previous fiscal year’s
operating budget that are available for appropriation for the current fiscal year.
Massachusetts’ Proposition 2½ sets a property tax levy limit for all municipalities. 24 The
excess property tax levy capacity is the difference between the property tax limit and the
actual property tax levy. Another informal form of fiscal slack is the overlay reserve, which
is an account used to fund the potential property tax abatements, exemptions and
uncollected taxes in a certain fiscal year. All these fiscal resources can be utilized by the
government to hedge against unforeseen revenue shortfalls and cope with sharp fiscal

Revenue diversity is measured by the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) by the formula as follows
(Suyderhoud 1994):
23

2

𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 =

1−(∑𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 )
1
𝑛

1−

,

where i indicates the individual municipality, 𝑡 refers to time, and 𝑋𝑗 specifies the proportion of revenue j
out of 𝑛 revenue resources. HHI ranges between 0 and 1 with a higher value indicating a more diversified
revenue structure.
24

The property tax limit is calculated by “(1) adding an automatic increase of 2½ percent to the previous
year’s levy limit and (2) adding an allowance for growth in service demands by multiplying the value of new
construction by the prior year’s tax rate.” (Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton 2015: 308).
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fluctuations or crises. This research uses the per capita free cash, excess tax capacity, and
overlay reserve as measures of informal fiscal slack, which may substitute or complement
stabilization funds. The sign of the correlation between these informal forms of fiscal slack
and the stabilization funds depends on the substitutional or complementary effect.
Outstanding debt. A government holding more outstanding debt has heavier fiscal
obligations in interest and principal payment. To prevent debt default, government with a
higher level of outstanding debt should save more fiscal slack. On the other hand, it is fairly
possible that government borrows due to fiscal difficulties; therefore, it does not have fiscal
resources to save. The correlation between government’s outstanding debt and fiscal slack
is indeterminate.
Government credit rating. Credit rating is an important indicator of government’s
overall fiscal conditions. It represents a comprehensive evaluation of the default risk of
governmental debt. A higher credit rating makes it easier for government to get access to
the financial market in fiscal emergencies, and it helps to reduce the borrowing cost. In this
vein, a higher credit rating reduces the importance of fiscal slack because it leaves
government more fiscal space to raise funding amid fiscal difficulties. On the other hand,
a higher credit rating implies healthier fiscal conditions and more stable revenues. Thus,
the correlation between government credit rating and fiscal slack size can be either positive
or negative.
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4.5

Empirical Results
4.5.1 Direct Effect of the Variables of Interest
This research first regresses equation (3) using the municipality and year fixed

effects with neither the municipal structure political-administrative index nor the
interaction items, which echoes the practice of most previous studies. This research takes
the natural logarithm of per capita stabilization fund balances as the dependent variable,
and the results are reported in model 1 of table 3.3. The effects of voters’ pro-spending and
anti-tax sentiment and government’s budgetary performance are consistent with hypothesis
1 and 2, and these results echo the findings of Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton (2015).
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Table 3.3 Empirical results

VARIABLES

(1)
Model 1

(2)
Model 2

(3)
Model 3

-0.00232***
(0.000724)
-0.0223***
(0.00669)
0.000640***
(0.000132)

-0.174
(0.313)
-0.00233*
(0.00131)
0.00341
(0.0110)
0.000716***
(0.000243)

-0.497
(0.332)
-0.00253**
(0.00129)
0.00223
(0.0111)
0.000848***
(0.000254)

Variables of interest
Municipal structure index
Pro-spending sentiment
Anti-tax sentiment
Budgetary gap
Interaction terms
Municipal structure index × Pro-spending sentiment

0.000610
(0.00167)
0.00529**
(0.00264)
-0.000383*
(0.000230)

Municipal structure index × Anti-tax sentiment
Municipal structure index × Budgetary gap
Control variables
Population size (log)

-0.584
(0.407)
0.0126*
(0.00726)
0.00811
(0.0270)
-0.880***
(0.200)
-0.00911
(0.0106)
0.794
(0.503)
0.00267***
(0.000305)
0.000380
(0.000367)
0.00882***
(0.00214)
-0.000556
(0.000691)
0.248***
(0.0698)

Population growth rate (%)
Unemployment rate (%)
Total assessed value of properties (per capita, log)
State aid as percentage of total revenues (%)
Revenue diversity (HHI)
Free cash (per capita)
Excess tax capacity (per capita)
Overlay reserve (per capita)
Outstanding debt as percentage of budget (%)
Government creditworthiness
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-1.719**
(0.744)
0.0252*
(0.0136)
-0.0823
(0.0738)
-1.678***
(0.403)
-0.0547***
(0.0211)
2.192*
(1.199)
0.00192***
(0.000614)
-0.000317
(0.000655)
0.00872*
(0.00468)
0.00138
(0.00154)
0.104
(0.136)

-1.616**
(0.727)
0.0259*
(0.0138)
-0.0848
(0.0732)
-1.508***
(0.399)
-0.0499**
(0.0210)
2.268*
(1.182)
0.00198***
(0.000612)
-0.000249
(0.000642)
0.00954**
(0.00453)
0.00155
(0.00152)
0.0739
(0.134)

Table 3.3 (continued)
Constant

16.49***
(4.622)

36.87***
(10.02)

Observations
4,177
1,306
R-squared
0.653
0.715
Municipality fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

33.93***
(9.862)
1,306
0.717
Yes
Yes

The results from regressing equation (3) using the municipality and year fixed
effects with the municipal structure index but not the interaction items are reported in
model 2 of table 3.3. The effect of the municipal structure index is not statistically
significant, implying that the political or administrative nature of municipal structure does
not directly exert influence on government fiscal slack. The pro-spending sentiment of
voters is negatively and statistically significantly related to government fiscal slack. Based
on the descriptive statistics presented in table 3.2 and the magnitude of effect, one standard
deviation increase in the measure of the pro-spending sentiment in a municipality makes
the per capita budget stabilization fund balances decline by over six percent, holding other
factors constant. The results support hypothesis 1. The results in model 2 also show that
the effect of budgetary gap is positive and statistically significant. This finding supports
hypothesis 2, implying that the government with an operating budget above the long-term
expected trend level is likely to save more fiscal slack. One standard deviation increase in
the per capita budgetary gap leads approximately to a 33 percent increase of the per capita
stabilization fund balances, holding other factors constant. The anti-tax sentiment is not
statistically significantly related to the dependent variable.
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4.5.2 Interactive Effect of the Variables of Interest
The last model of table 3.3 reports the results from regressing equation (4) using
the municipality and year fixed effects with the municipal structure index and the
interaction items. In the multiplicative interaction regression model, the effects of voters’
pro-spending and anti-tax sentiment and government’s budgetary gap on government fiscal
slack size are conditional on the municipal structure index. Therefore, interpreting the
coefficients as unconditional or average effects is problematic (Brambor, Clark, and Golder
2005).
The budgetary gap is still positively and statistically significantly related to the
dependent variable in model 3 with a magnitude of the effect close to those in model 1 and
2. Meanwhile, the effect of the interaction item between the municipal structure index and
budgetary gap is negative and statistically significant, meaning that the positive effect of
budgetary gap is modified and weakened by government internal management. As the
nature of government internal management becomes more administrative or professional,
the positive effect of budgetary gap becomes weaker. The results are consistent with
hypothesis 3. A possible explanation is that the more administrative or professional
government internal management may invest the fiscal slack resources for long-run
economic development, to fund capital projects, or to achieve certain policy goals in times
with vigorous budgetary performance, instead of saving the fiscal resources, due to the
potential opportunity cost it brings about.
Figure 3.2 shows the predicted marginal effect of the budgetary gap on stabilization
fund balances of Massachusetts municipalities conditional on the municipal structure index
with 95% confidence intervals. The vertical axis indicates the predicted marginal effect of
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the budgetary gap, holding other variables at means, and the horizontal axis denotes the
municipal structure political-professional index at an interval of 0.2. Figure 3.2 shows that
the predicted marginal effect of the budgetary gap is always positive. However, the positive
predicted marginal effect decreases as the nature of government internal management
become more administrative or professional. The predicted marginal effect of the
budgetary gap is statistically significant because the upper and lower bounds of the
confidence intervals are always above the zero line (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2005).
Figure 3.2 Average marginal effects of budgetary gap on stabilization fund balances
conditional on municipal structure index with 95% CIs

Results in model 3 of table 3.3 also show that the effect of voters’ pro-spending
sentiment is negative and statistically significant, and the magnitude of the effect is close
to those in model 1 and 2. However, the effect of the interaction item between the municipal
structure index and pro-spending sentiment is positive but not statistically significant.
Figure 3.3 shows the predicted marginal effect of the pro-spending sentiment of voters is
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always negative. As the nature of government internal management become more
administrative or professional, the magnitude of the negative predicted marginal effect
decreases. This finding implies that the negative effect of voters’ pro-spending sentiment
on government fiscal slack size is modified or weakened by government internal
management. Based on the confidence interval lines, the conditional effect of pro-spending
sentiment is statistically significant when the municipal structure index ranges between
around -0.6 and 0.4, which suggests the more administrative municipal structure.
Figure 3.3 Average marginal effects of voters’ pro-spending sentiment on stabilization
fund balances conditional on municipal structure index with 95% CIs

Lastly, the effect of anti-tax sentiment of voters is not statistically significant.
However, the effect of the interaction item between the municipal structure index and antitax sentiment is positive and statistically significant. Figure 3.4 shows that although
government internal management modifies or weakens the negative predicted marginal
effect of the anti-tax sentiment on government fiscal slack size, the effect is not statistically
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significant because the zero line traverses the area between the upper and lower bounds of
the confidence intervals.
Figure 3.4 Average marginal effects of voters’ anti-tax sentiment on stabilization fund
balances conditional on municipal structure index with 95% CIs

4.5.3 Robustness Checks
Massachusetts municipalities maintain the stabilization funds as their formal fiscal
slack. However, as aforementioned, there are other forms of fiscal resources that play
similar roles with government fiscal slack. Employing a broader definition, government
fiscal slack can be any fiscal resources reserved in various governmental funds that are
used to make up for unexpected revenue shortfalls and prepare for potential fiscal
difficulties in the future (Wei and Denison 2019). In this vein, the excess tax capacity, free
cash, and overlay reserve can be deemed as informal fiscal slack of government, although
they have different purposes, features and functions. Previous studies have investigated the
relation between different forms of government fiscal slack in the U.S. states, and most
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find that the substitution effect is trivial (Hou and Brewer 2010; Knight and Levinson 1999).
The results in table 3.3 show that two informal forms of fiscal slack, the free cash and
overlay reserve, are positively and statistically significantly related to the stabilization fund
balances in Massachusetts municipalities.
As a robustness check, this study uses the natural logarithm of per capita total of
the stabilization funds, excess tax capacity, free cash and overlay reserve as an alternative
measure of government fiscal slack. The results from regressing the same estimation
models are reported in table 3.4. The statistical significance of the effects of variables of
interest remain similar, but the magnitudes of effects is different on the grounds that the
measure of fiscal slack has changed.
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Table 3.4 Robustness check using an alternative measure of fiscal slack

VARIABLES

(1)
Model 1

(2)
Model 2

(3)
Model 3

-0.00216***
(0.000301)
-0.00665**
(0.00272)
0.000341***
(4.55e-05)

0.0431
(0.0639)
-0.00250***
(0.000613)
0.00492
(0.00438)
0.000337***
(9.11e-05)

0.191**
(0.0958)
-0.00247***
(0.000686)
0.00531
(0.00436)
0.000259**
(0.000103)

Variables of interest
Municipal structure index
Pro-spending sentiment
Anti-tax sentiment
Budgetary gap
Interaction terms
Municipal structure index × Pro-spending sentiment

1.81e-05
(0.00114)
-0.00240**
(0.00114)
-0.000211*
(0.000109)

Municipal structure index × Anti-tax sentiment
Municipal structure index × Budgetary gap
Control variables
Population size (log)
Population growth rate (%)
Unemployment rate (%)
Total assessed value of properties (per capita, log)
State aid as percentage of total revenues (%)
Revenue diversity (HHI)
Outstanding debt as percentage of budget (%)
Government creditworthiness

Constant

Observations
R-squared
Municipality fixed effects
109

-0.834***
(0.187)
0.00716**
(0.00335)
-0.00520
(0.00856)
-0.408***
(0.0913)
-0.00265
(0.00467)
1.172***
(0.234)
-0.000496
(0.000334)
0.224***
(0.0342)

-1.473***
(0.341)
0.0107**
(0.00498)
-0.0371*
(0.0219)
-0.281*
(0.165)
-0.0126
(0.00824)
1.080**
(0.463)
0.000700
(0.000644)
0.162***
(0.0573)

-1.511***
(0.343)
0.0105**
(0.00487)
-0.0357
(0.0218)
-0.358**
(0.158)
-0.0145*
(0.00815)
1.034**
(0.468)
0.000609
(0.000649)
0.173***
(0.0569)

15.59***
(2.267)

20.99***
(4.575)

22.23***
(4.489)

4,231
0.679
Yes

1,286
0.753
Yes

1,286
0.756
Yes

Table 3.4 (continued)
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Yes

Another robustness check regards the measure of the pro-spending sentiment of
voters. As previously mentioned, this research adjusts the method of Snow, Gianakis, and
Haughton (2015) to measure the pro-spending sentiment of voters. As a robustness check,
this research then firmly follows the practice of Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton (2015) to
use a binary measure, with 1 indicating the occurrence of a successful property tax limit
override in a certain municipality and 0 otherwise. The occurrence of successful overrides
suggests stronger pro-spending sentiment of voters. The results from regressing the same
models with the previous robustness check by substituting the measure of voters’ prospending sentiment are reported in table 3.5. The results in table 3.4 and 3.5 are similar in
both the statistical significance and magnitudes of effects of the variables.
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Table 3.5 Robustness check using an alternative measure of pro-spending sentiment

VARIABLES

(1)
Model 1

(2)
Model 2

(3)
Model 3

-0.225***
(0.0288)
-0.00691**
(0.00271)
0.000335***
(4.55e-05)

0.0407
(0.0636)
-0.236***
(0.0554)
0.00485
(0.00438)
0.000336***
(9.11e-05)

0.188**
(0.0954)
-0.242***
(0.0606)
0.00526
(0.00436)
0.000259**
(0.000103)

Variables of interest
Municipal structure index
Pro-spending sentiment (occurrence)
Anti-tax sentiment
Budgetary gap
Interaction terms
Municipal structure index × Pro-spending sentiment

0.0215
(0.103)
-0.00242**
(0.00114)
-0.000210*
(0.000108)

Municipal structure index × Anti-tax sentiment
Municipal structure index × Budgetary gap
Control variables
Population size (log)
Population growth rate (%)
Unemployment rate (%)
Total assessed value of properties (per capita, log)
State aid as percentage of total revenues (%)
Revenue diversity (HHI)
Outstanding debt as percentage of budget (%)
Government creditworthiness

Constant

Observations
R-squared
Municipality fixed effects
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-0.837***
(0.187)
0.00743**
(0.00337)
-0.00435
(0.00839)
-0.405***
(0.0912)
-0.00240
(0.00467)
1.192***
(0.233)
-0.000497
(0.000333)
0.226***
(0.0342)

-1.472***
(0.340)
0.0109**
(0.00499)
-0.0378*
(0.0220)
-0.286*
(0.165)
-0.0126
(0.00821)
1.076**
(0.463)
0.000694
(0.000643)
0.161***
(0.0573)

-1.509***
(0.341)
0.0106**
(0.00489)
-0.0364*
(0.0219)
-0.364**
(0.158)
-0.0145*
(0.00812)
1.031**
(0.468)
0.000601
(0.000650)
0.173***
(0.0569)

15.57***
(2.266)

21.05***
(4.565)

22.30***
(4.478)

4,231
0.680
Yes

1,286
0.753
Yes

1,286
0.756
Yes

Table 3.5 (continued)
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

4.6

Yes

Conclusion and Discussion
Saving fiscal slack in economic booms to prepare for fiscal crises in the future is a

prevailing strategy adopted by the U.S. state and local governments. Fiscal slack of local
government is a more salient issue compared to the state due to the large size and informal
forms. This research focuses on one of the most fundamental inquiries about local
government fiscal slack, namely, the determinants of its size. This research constructs a
three-dimensional framework to analyze local government fiscal slack, including the
preferences of voters (anti-tax and pro-spending sentiment), government’s budgetary
performance (budgetary gap), and government internal management (municipal structure
index on the political-administrative dimension). The three dimensions work interactively
to determine local government fiscal slack. This study uses Massachusetts municipalities
as a research sample. The empirical findings show that the defined budgetary gap is
positively and statistically significantly related to government’s fiscal slack balances,
which is measured by either the level of stabilization funds or the sum of stabilization funds
and other informal forms of fiscal slack resources. However, the municipal structure
political-administrative index weakens the positive effect of the budgetary gap. The prospending sentiment of voters has a negative effect on government fiscal slack, and the
municipal structure index weakens the negative effect.
Findings from this study have substantial implications for academics and
government financial management practitioners. Fiscal resources shape “many of the
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outcomes that matter to public administration, including the effectiveness of public service
delivery networks, the decision to undertake management reforms, performance
implications of managers’ networking activities, and nonprofits’ decisions to pursue
‘entrepreneurial’ activities.” (Kioko et al. 2011). In-depth understanding of the
determinants of government fiscal slack helps government officials wisely save and spend
in the cyclical economic upturn and downturn times and maintain a long-term fiscal
sustainability.
Government fiscal slack is an important public management issue pertaining to
budgetary transparency (Rose and Smith 2012; Stewart et al. 2015). Local government
usually uses such informal fiscal slack as the year-end general fund balances (Guo and
Wang 2017; Wang and Hou 2012). The informal form renders local government fiscal
slack a nontransparent “grey area”. Scholars of economics and organizational science have
investigated the misuse of fiscal slack and the agency problem between managers and
shareholders of private sector organizations (Bebchuk and Fried 2003; Jensen 1986).
Similar problems exist in the public sector. The lengthiness and complexity of government
financial reports, such as the Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs), create
difficulties for ordinary voters and the media to monitor the fiscal management of local
government effectively and efficiently, thus forging opportunities for officials’ misuse of
public fiscal resources and corruption actions (Benito and Bastida 2009; Stewart et al.
2015). Moreover, the size of local government fiscal slack is generally larger compared to
the state government. Credit rating agencies and professional organizations commonly
recommend that government maintains 5-15 percent of their operating budget as fiscal
reserves (Gore 2009). However, many local governments hold a much higher level of fiscal
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slack (Marlowe 2005). Understanding the determinants of local government fiscal slack
facilitates voters and the media to properly monitor and regulate the saving behavior of
government and help government officials to enact and implement prudent fiscal slack
policies.
It is also helpful to discuss the potential limitation of this research in external
generalizability. Considering the substantial variation in the measurement of local
government fiscal slack and differences in institutional rules and external fiscal
environments confronted by the local governments across states, this research focuses on
municipalities from one single state. This is a common practice employed by scholars of
many previous studies, such as Minnesota in Marlowe (2005), Florida in Guo and Wang
(2017), North Carolina in Wang and Hou (2012), and Massachusetts in Gianakis and Snow
(2007). As noted by Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton (2015), “research that crosses state
lines must cope with the lack of a common dependent variable, a problem that is not easily
resolved.” Further studies that use similar research approaches but take research examples
from other states are highly encouraged.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 Summary of statewide tax limitation ballot questions (1980-2010)
Question
number
1

3

6

3

4

Year

Summary of ballot questions

1980 The proposed law would impose a limit on state and local taxes
on real estate and personal property equal to 2.5% of the full
and fair cash value of the property being taxed.
1986 The proposed law would reduce and then repeal the 7.5% surtax
on Massachusetts state income taxes and would limit state tax
revenue growth to the level of growth in total wages and
salaries of the citizens of the state.
1994 This proposed constitutional amendment would require
Massachusetts income tax rates to be graduated, in order to
distribute the burden of the tax fairly and equitably.
1998 This proposed law would change the state income tax rate on
interest and dividend income, which was 12% as of September
1997, to whatever rate applies to Part B taxable income (such as
wages and salaries), which was 5.95% as of September 1997.
The change would take effect starting in tax year 2000.
2000 This proposed law would repeal the law setting the state
personal income tax rate on Part B taxable income (such as
wages and salaries), which was 5.95% as of September 1,1999
and would set the rate at 5.6% for tax year 2001, 5.3% for tax
year 2002, and 5% for tax year 2003 and after. If the
Legislature set a lower rate for any of those years, that lower
rate would apply.
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Statewide
fraction of “yes”
59.00%

Statewide
fraction of “no”
41.00%

54.40%

45.60%

Yes

69.60%

30.40%

Yes

81.90%

18.10%

Yes

59.40%

40.60%

Yes

Enacted?
Yes

1

1

3

1.
2.
3.
4.

2002 This proposed law would provide that no income or other gain
45.30%
54.70%
No
realized on or after July 1, 2003, would be subject to the state
personal income tax.
2008 This proposed law would reduce the state personal income tax
30.60%
69.40%
No
rate to 2.65% for all categories of taxable income for the tax
year beginning on or after January 1, 2009, and would eliminate
the tax for all tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2010.
2010 This proposed law would reduce the state sales and use tax rates
43.20%
56.80%
No
(which were 6.25% as of September 2009) to 3% as of January
1, 2011.
Notes:
The fractions of “yes” and “no” are for statewide voting results. There are records for the corresponding voting results for each
Massachusetts municipality, which are utilized to calculate the anti-tax sentiment of voters in each municipality.
Information presented in this table is accessible from the website of Massachusetts Election Statistics at
http://electionstats.state.ma.us/ballot_questions/search/year_from:1972/year_to:2016.
Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton (2015) report similar information in their research. Refer to the table 1 in that article for details.
Question 6 in 1994 regards the distribution of tax burden. The proposed amendment would require tax rates be progressive as
the income increases. Therefore, this amendment has the equivalent consequence of increasing tax burdens of taxpayers with
higher incomes. “Yes” in this question means in favor of tax increase and “no” means supporting tax limitation. The percentages
of “yes” and “no” are switched to make them consistent with other questions.
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APPENDIX 2 Factor analysis of components of the principal factor
Index components
Existence of a chief administrative officer
Election method of the government head
Independence of government head from council (board)
Authority of government head to veto council (board)
Partisan or nonpartisan election of council (board) members
At-large or by-district election of council (board) members
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Principal factor Uniqueness
0.7727
0.4018
0.5694
0.6348
0.9395
0.115
0.9257
0.1425
0.6669
0.5484
0.0552
0.9381
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